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REMEDYING WRONGFUL EXECUTION
MeghanJ. Ryan*
The first legal determination of wrongful execution in the United States may very
well be in the making in Texas. One of the state's district courts is in the midst of
investigating whether Cameron Todd Willingham, who was executed in 2004,
was actually innocent. The court's investigation has been interrupted by objections
from Texas prosecutors, but if the court proceeds, this may very well become a bona
fide case of wrongful execution. Texas, just like other jurisdictions, is ill equipped
to provide any relief for such an egregious wrong, however. This Article identifies
the difficulties that the heirs, families, and friends of wrongfully executed individ-
uals face in attempting to obtain compensation for this wrong. The Article
highlights that statutory compensation schemes overlook the issue of wrongful exe-
cution and the greater injustice it entails and urges that the statutes be amended
in light of this grievous wrong that has come to the fore of American criminal jus-
tice systems.
The only statement I want to make is that I am an innocent man
convicted of a crime I did not commit. I have been persecuted for
twelve years for something I did not do. From God's dust I came and
to dust I will return, so the Earth shall become my throne.
-Cameron Todd Willingham
INTRODUCTION
At 6:30 p.m. on February 17, 2004, Cameron Todd Willingham's
heart stopped.' He had been executed by lethal injection for kill-
ing his three small children-Amber, Karmon, and Kameron
Willingham. Prior to Willingham's execution, though, evidence
Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law.
I thank Fred Moss, Barry Scheck, Josh Tate, Jenia lontcheva Turner, Jessica Dixon Weaver,
and the SMU Criminal Justice Forum for their insights. I thank Donna Bowmen, Claire
James, and Brenda Tso for their research assistance and the SMU Dedman School of Law for
financial support.
1. See David Grann, Trial try Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER,
Sept. 7, 2009, at 63.
2. Amber was Willingham's stepdaughter. See Jennifer Emily, Texas Forensic Science
Commission Refuses to End Inquiry into Willingham Arson Case, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Sept.
18, 2010, 12:03 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/headlines/20100917-Texas-
Forensic-Science-Commission-refuses-to-8825.ece.
3. See id. at 42.
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began to surface that he had been wrongfully convicted. This evi-
dence did not dissuade Texas from proceeding with Willingham's
execution. And, after Willingham had been executed, the evidence
of wrongful conviction became even more certain.
In the wake of the exculpatory evidence coming to light,
Willingham's relatives have made efforts to have Willingham post-
humously exonerated.6 Their efforts have run straight into legal
blockades, however.! This is not unusual when dealing with indi-
viduals allegedly wrongfully executed.! For a variety of reasons, it is
extremely difficult to reach a legal determination of wrongful exe-
cution, and such a conclusion has never been reached in America's
more than 400-year history of executing criminal defendants.' If
4. See generally Report of Dr. Gerald Hurst at 1, 3-4, Ex Parte Cameron Todd Willing-
ham, No. 24,4670 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Feb. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Report of Dr. Gerald Hurst],
available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Willingham-Hurst-Report.pdf (point-
ing out "critical errors" in the fire investigation report in the Willingham case).
5. See Grann, supra note 1.
6. See Dave Montgomery, judge Orders Court of Inquiry into Willingham's Conviction, Exe-
cution, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 27, 2010 (explaining that a Texas county court
judge "ordered a court of inquiry to determine if Cameron Todd Willingham was wrongfully
convicted and executed" after his relatives filed a petition requesting this action). Courts,
scholars, journalists, and politicians use the term "exoneration" rather loosely. Some use the
term fairly broadly when evidence that strongly suggests that a convicted individual is inno-
cent has surfaced. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Part II: Report to the ALl
Concerning Capital Punishment, 89 TEX. L. REv. 367, 409 (2010) (suggesting that even though
some convicted individuals were "exonerated by DNA evidence," they were unable to obtain
relief); Samuel Wiseman, Innocence After Death, 60 CASE W. RES. L. Rav. 687, 690 (2010)
(explaining that DNA evidence suggesting that a convicted individual is innocent does not
necessarily lead to "formal" exoneration). Others use the term to refer only to instances in
which the convicted individual has been acquitted on retrial, the charges against him have
been dismissed on the ground of new evidence, or he has been pardoned on the ground of
actual innocence. SeeJames R. Acker & Catherine L. Bonventre, Protecting the Innocent in New
York: Moving Beyond Changing Only Their Names, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1245, 1250-51 (2010); see also
Steiker & Steiker, supra, at 408 (noting that "there is debate about what constitutes a full
'exoneration'"); Wiseman, supra, at 694 & n.42 (explaining that there are variations in the
meaning of the term and that he considers exonerations to be "only those cases that official-
ly relieve a factually innocent, convicted individual of any guilt associated with the crime
charged," regardless of whether this is "through dropped charges, a dismissed indictment
and vacated conviction, a reversal or acquittal that specifically declares the individual inno-
cent or otherwise free of guilt and vacates the conviction, or an official pardon or similar
executive exoneration granted on actual innocence grounds"). I will follow the latter trend
in this Article, which seems to be the ordinary convention among legal scholars at least.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 74-83 (describing some of the difficulties
Willingham's relatives have faced in trying to exonerate Willingham).
8. See infra Part II (setting forth some of the difficulties individuals face in seeking a
determination of wrongful execution).
9. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 188 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that if
there were a clear case of an innocent person being executed, "we would not have to hunt for
it; the innocent's name would be shouted from the rooftops by the abolition lobby"); Introduc-
tion to the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-
history-death-penalty (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) ("The first recorded execution in the new
colonies was that of Captain George Kendall in the Jamestown colony of Virginia in 1608.");
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Willingham's relatives succeed in exonerating Willingham, howev-
er, or if any court reaches the determination that an individual has
been wrongfully executed, there seem to be no real remedies avail-
able to the wrongfully executed individual or his family. Various
immunities may protect potential defendants from liability in sur-
vival suits, wrongful death claims, and federal civil rights suits if
one could even make out these claims under the applicable stat-
utes. And unlike the instance of wrongful conviction and
incarceration, there appear to be no legislative remedies targeting
cases of wrongful execution, despite the fact that many would
agree that wrongful execution constitutes an even more egregious
wrong." This chasm in legislative remedies must be filled in order
to make government officials and ordinary citizens face the signifi-
cance of their death decisions.
This Article argues that the heinous wrong of executing inno-
cent individuals should be statutorily recognized. Part I traces the
story of Cameron Todd Willingham, a man who was executed in
the face of evidence suggesting that he was innocent. It examines
his relatives' recent attempts to clear his name and explains that
his story is not yet over. Part II describes the difficulties of exoner-
ating individuals who have been wrongfully executed. It explains
how DNA is often essential to posthumous exonerations and notes
prosecutors' reluctance to release DNA evidence for fear that it
could undermine interests in the finality of convictions and even
prosecutors' own convictions rates. Part III explores possible rem-
edies for adjudged wrongful executions. This Part draws on
remedies employed in the wrongful conviction and incarceration
context and explains how common law tort and civil rights reme-
dies are often unavailable to these types of defendants. It adds a
layer of complexity, however, by explaining how a decedent's fami-
ly, friends, and heirs must resort to wrongful death and survival
suits to prevail under common law tort regimes. In each of these
instances, the doctrines of governmental and official immunities
will likely thwart any efforts to recover for the wrongful execution.
Part III also explores how about half of the states have enacted
statutory compensation schemes to provide relief for those who
infta Part II (setting forth some of the difficulties individuals face in seeking a determination of
wrongful execution). But see Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages ofJustice in
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 72 (1987) (cataloging twenty-three cases in
which the authors believe innocent individuals were wrongfully executed).
10. See, e.g., John O'Connor, Death Penalty Ban: It's Up to Quinn, CHI. DAILY HERALD,
Jan. 12, 2011, at 2 (quoting the parents of a minor rape victim who was murdered: "One of
the most terrible events in our society is the wrongful conviction of an innocent person;
even worse would be their execution.").
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have been wrongfully convicted and incarcerated. These statutory
schemes, though, fail to account for the harm of wrongful
execution-an issue explored in Part IV. This Article concludes
that amending these statutory compensation schemes to account
for this greater wrong of executing an innocent individual would
not only stay true to Supreme Court case law emphasizing that
death is a worse punishment than even life imprisonment, but it
would also encourage government officials to recognize the im-
portance of their ratifying or acquiescing in determinations that
individuals should be executed.
I. CAMERON TODD WILLINGHAM:
A CASE OF WRONGFUL EXECUTION?
In early 1992, neighbors observed Willingham stumbling out of
his Corsicana, Texas home, which was in flames." He screamed for
his babies who were still inside. 2 Firefighters arrived at the scene
and had to hold Willingham back from trying to rescue his three
daughters whom he had left in the house. 3 Although rescue per-
sonnel tried to save the girls, all three of them succumbed to
smoke inhalation. 4
In the wake of this tragedy, fire investigators sought to deter-
mine the cause of the fire. The chief fire investigators in the case,
Manuel Vasquez and Douglas Fogg, ultimately determined that the
fire had been purposely set with an accelerant, and Willingham-
the only individual at the scene who had survived the fire-became
the prime suspect of the investigation. According to Fogg and
Vasquez, there were numerous indicators of arson," including: (1)
11. Transcript of Record at 110-11, State v. Willingham, No. 24,467 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug.
18, 1992) [hereinafter Willingham Transcript-Day 1], available at http://www.scribd.com/full/
37711169?access..key-key-qjl6fty0v6hevvk77kh.
12. See id. at 53-54, 76-77, 88, 103, 111. Although numerous commentators emphasize
Willingham's distress, reflected by his hysterical screaming, at least one witness suggested
that this was contrived. See id. at 54 (stating that Willingham's screaming started only once
neighbors stepped outside of their homes to see what was going on).
13. See id. at 149. At least one witness suggested, however, that Willingham refused to
enter the burning house despite her prompting. See id. at 58.
14. Transcript of Record at 82, 84, 104-05, State v. Willingham, No. 24,467 (Tex. Dist.
Ct. Aug. 19, 1992) [hereinafter Willingham Transcript-Day 2], available at http://
www.scribd.com/full/37711321?access-key=key-1whx4cvp7vlxl2shu0ux.
15. See Willingham Transcript-Day 1, supra note 11, at 258, 261-62, 268.
16. Report of Dr. Gerald Hurst, supra note 4, at 1, 3-4. The fire investigators reported
that there were over twenty indicators of arson, but their report stating this was not entered
into evidence at trial. See INNOCENCE PROJECT ARSON REVIEW COMM., REPORT ON THE PEER
REVIEW OF THE EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE CASES OF STATE OF TEXAS V. CAMERON TODD
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puddle-shaped burn marks on the floors," (2) several burn areas
suggesting multiple origins of the fire,"(3) multiple "V" char pat-
terns on the floors,'9 (4) the charring of wood under the front
door's aluminum threshold,o (5) tiles burned from underneath,
(6) "crazed glass" in the windows, (7) brown rings on the cement
porch, and (8) a laboratory result indicating the presence of ker-
osene.24 Additionally, the fire investigators were suspicious that the
refrigerator was partially blocking the home's exit2 and that
Willingham's bare feet were not burned during his escape from the
fire.26 After it became public that Willingham was considered to
have intentionally set the fire that killed his three girls, witnesses
began reporting that Willingham had failed to act as distraught as
he should have when he watched his home burn to the ground
and after his three daughters had passed away. Further, one of
Willingham's fellow inmates while he was awaiting trial swore that
Willingham had confessed to him. While there was no clear mo-
tive for this crime, authorities relied on Willingham's apparent
indifference toward the death of his children2 9 and the allegedly
WILLINGHAM AND STATE OF TEXAS V. ERNEST RAY WILLIs 17, 19 (2006), available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/ArsonReviewReport.pdf.
17. See Willingham Transcript-Day 1, supra note 11, at 238-39, 242-43, 245, 250, 256-
57.
18. See id. at 239, 254-55, 261.
19. See id. at 238-40.
20. See id. at 248-49, 251; Willingham Transcript-Day 2, supra note 14, at 48.
21. See Willingham Transcript-Day 1, supra note 11, at 243.
22. See Report of Dr. Gerald Hurst, supra note 4, at 2. There appears not to have been
any mention of crazed glass at Willingham's trial, however.
23. See Willingham Transcript-Day 1, supra note 11, at 248-49, 252-53.
24. See id. at 215-20.
25. See id. at 233; Transcript of Record at 35-36, State v. Willingham, No. 24,467 (Tex.
Dist. Ct. Aug. 20, 1992) [hereinafter Willingham Transcript-Day 3], available at
http://www.scribd.com/full/37711363?access.key-key-lcg940uxf8585061vfep; Transcript of
Record at 28, State v. Willingham, No. 24,467 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21, 1992) [hereinafter
Willingham Transcript-Day 4], available at http://www.scribd.com/full/37711449?access_
key-key-snOms7oyt7qu5zosl Ii.
26. See Willingham Transcript-Day 1, supra note 11, at 266-67; Willingham Transcript-
Day 2, supra note 14, at 52.
27. See Grann, supra note 1, at 45 ("Several, like Father Monaghan, initially portrayed
Willingham as devastated by the fire. Yet, over time, an increasing number of witnesses of-
fered damning statements."); see, e.g., Willingham Transcript-Day 1, supra note 11, at 106 ("It
was not the attitude of people that just lost their children should have had. It was more of a
laughing, cutting-up type attitude."); see also Willingham Transcript-Day 1, supra note 11, at
111 ("He just-he wasn't real excited.").
28. SeeWillingham Transcript-Day 1, supra note 11, at 17-19.
29. See, e.g., id., (suggesting that Willingham was not noticeably upset after his children
had been killed in the fire), 111 (stating that, although his children were trapped inside the
burning house, Willingham "wasn't real excited"). Moreover, during the punishment phase
of the trial, the prosecution painted Willingham as a "sociopath" who had a strong history of
violence. See, e.g., Transcript of Record (Punishment Phase Evidence) at 23-25, 35-36,
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violent images he had placed on his bedroom walls to establish a
tableau from which a jury could elicit motive. Prosecutors offered
Willingham a sentence of life imprisonment in exchange for a
guilty plea, but Willingham refused, continuing to assert his
innocence.3' After a two-day trial and just over an hour of jury
deliberation, Willingham was convicted of three counts of capital
murder and sentenced to death.
Willingham appealed his death sentence and petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus in both the state and federal courts. The
courts denied all of his appeals and petitions, and, in December
2003, Willingham received word that his date of execution had
been set:
[T]he Director of the Department of Criminal Justice at
Huntsville, Texas, acting by and through the executioner des-
ignated by said Director ... is hereby DIRECTED and
COMMANDED, at some hour after 6:00 p.m. on the 17th day
of February, 2004, at the Department of Criminal Justice in
Huntsville, Texas, to carry out this sentence of death by intra-
venous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal
quantity sufficient to cause the death of said Cameron Todd
Willingham.
Texas Governor Rick Perry, it seemed, had become Willingham's
only hope at living past February 17, 2004.3'
In early 2004, new evidence arose that cast some doubt on
Willingham's guilt. Willingham's relatives had contacted a well-
known fire investigator, Dr. Gerald Hurst, and had asked him to
review the evidence against Willingham.35 Dr. Hurst agreed to take
92-94, State v. Willingham, No. 24,467 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug. 20, 1992), available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/WillinghamTranscript/Willinghamvl4.pdf (accus-
ing Willingham of physically abusing his wife, recounting that Willingham had bragged
about killing a dog, and suggesting that Willingham is an "extremely severe sociopath" who
has no conscience and cannot be rehabilitated).
30. See Willingham Transcript-Day 3, supra note 25, at 47.
31. See Grann, supra note 1, at 48.
32. See Willingham Transcript-Day 4, supra note 25, at 28, 49; Steve Mills & Maurice
Possley, Man Executed on Disproved Forensics: Fire that Killed His 3 Children Could Have Been
Accidenta4 CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 2004, at Al.
33. Grann, supra note 1, at 57.
34. See id. The Texas Constitution empowers the governor, "on the written signed rec-
ommendation and advice of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, or a majority thereof, to
grant reprieves and commutations of punishment and pardons," and also endows the gov-
ernor with "the power to grant one reprieve in any capital case for a period not to exceed
thirty (30) days." TEX. CONST. art. 4, § 11(b).
35. Grann, supra note 1, at 57.
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a look and concluded that the fire investigation report in Willing-
ham's case contained "critical errors" and that "most of the
conclusions reached by the Fire Marshall would be considered in-
valid in light of current knowledge" about fire investigation.36 In
particular, Dr. Hurst determined that at least eight of the indicators
of arson that the fire investigation report identified were not, in
fact, clear indicators of arson.3 ' The puddle configurations or
"pour patterns" that the prosecution had referred to at trial could
have been caused regardless of whether accelerant was used to set
the fire. Indeed, in fires like the one that occurred at Willing-
ham's home, it is "impossible to identify accelerant burns
visually,"39 as the fire investigators in Willingham's case had pur-
ported to do. The fire investigators' conclusion of multiple origins
was "inappropriate," Hurst reported, even on the basis of the prim-
itive arson science in use at the time of Willingham's trial.4
Further, the multiple V-patterns on the walls of Willingham's burnt
house were likely not indicators of multiple origins of the fire,
Hurst stated, but instead reflected the fact that the fire had spread
wildly and could have ignited various combustible items in its
wake.4 1 Similarly, Hurst concluded that the fire investigators' theory
that an accelerant had caused the wood under the aluminum
threshold to burn and had caused tiles to burn from underneath
was "clearly impossible" and again a remnant of outdated fire in-
vestigation theories. Moreover, "[t]he idea that crazed glass is an
indicator of the use of a liquid accelerant . . . [is also now consid-
ered] an 'Old Wives Tale.' "4' The brown rings on the cement
porch, too, did not indicate the use of an accelerant, Hurst con-
cluded.44 This was merely "baseless speculation" on the part of the
fire investigators.46 Finally, Hurst found that the fire marshal had
mischaracterized the evidence by reporting that kerosene was
found by the doorway adjacent to the cement porch. The chemi-
cal analysis on the sample instead revealed the presence of
"'mineral spirits of kerosene,' which is not the same thing."4, These
36. See Report of Dr. Gerald Hurst, supra note 4, at 1.
37. See id. at 2-5.




42. See id. at 3-4.
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mineral spirits of kerosene would be expected in the wreckage of
any fire, whether it resulted naturally or from arson.
Despite this new evidence, the Texas Board of Pardons and Pa-
roles-which reviews clemency applications-unanimously denied
Willingham's petition for clemency on February 13, 2004.49 This
was just four days before Willingham was scheduled to be execut-
ed.s0 The Innocence Project swiftly sought access to the records
from the Board and the governor's office and discovered that these
entities had received Dr. Hurst's report but that no one had offi-
cially acknowledged it."' According to the Innocence Project,
"[t]his lack of action indicates that in the days and hours before
Willingham was executed, the Governor's Office and the Board of
Pardons and Paroles ignored critical expert analysis-new scientific
information-that cast serious doubt on whether the Willingham
fire was arson.",52 Ultimately, Governor Perry failed to grant
Willingham clemency or stay the execution, and Willingham was
duly executed as scheduled on February 17, 2004..
After Willingham's execution, the national media got wind of
the story that Texas may have executed an innocent man.54 The
Chicago Tribune published an investigative report, which concluded
that "Willingham was prosecuted and convicted based primarily on
arson theories that have since been repudiated by scientific ad-
48. See id.
49. See Minutes, Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles (May 13, 2004), available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Willinghamjfoia.pdf; Letter from Maria Ramirez,
Clemency Adm'r, Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, to Walter Reaves,Jr., Attorney at Law
(Feb. 13, 2004), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Willingham-foia.pdf.
According to reporter David Grann, Willingham's attorney could not explain the Board's
decision:
[T]he board deliberates in secret, and its members are not bound by any specific cri-
teria. The board members did not even have to review Willingham's materials, and
usually don't debate a case in person; rather, they cast their votes by fax-a process
that has become known as "death by fax."
Grann, supra note 1, at 62.
50. Grann, supra note 1, at 62.
51. See MATERIAL FROM GOVERNOR PERRY'S OFFICE AND BOARD OF PARDONS AND PA-
ROLES, OBTAINED THROUGH OPEN RECORDS ACT REQUESTS, INNOCENCE PROJECT (2006),
available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Willingham-foia.pdf.
52. See id. at 2.
53. While Governor Perry had the power to stay Willingham's execution, see supra note
34, he could not grant a reprieve to Willingham without the Board of Pardons and Paroles'
recommendation. See id.; see alsoEx Parte Lefors, 303 S.W.2d 394, 400 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957)
(suggesting that the governor may not grant clemency when the Board of Pardons and Pa-
roles has not recommended it).
54. See, e.g., Grann, supra note 1, at 63; Mills & Possley, supra note 32.
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vances."55 And the New Yorker published an investigative report simi-
larly highlighting the defects in the arson evidence relied on at
Willingham's trial." While much of the media coverage glossed
over the other evidence against Willingham-such as the testimony
of the jailhouse snitch who claimed that Willingham had confessed
to him5-the coverage highlighted the significance of the possibil-
ity of wrongful execution.
The Innocence Project is similarly convinced that Texas execut-
ed an innocent man. In 2006, the organization commissioned
leading arson experts to study Willingham's case and issued a re-
port characterizing his execution as a "miscarriage[] ofjustice" and
calling for better education among fire investigators, as well as oth-
er reforms." The Innocence Project also submitted Willingham's
case to the Texas Forensic Science Commission (FSC), a group
charged with "investigat[ing] complaints that allege professional
negligence or misconduct by a laboratory, facility or entity .. . that
would substantially affect the integrity of the results of a forensic
analysis."59 The FSC agreed to investigate the case, but its review
was repeatedly postponed. In 2009, for example, Governor Perry
replaced the chairman and two other members of the FSC, forcing
the deferral of a scheduled hearing on the case.co In January 2011,
the FSC delayed issuing its final decision on the merits of the arson
investigation in Willingham's case after experts testified that "the
fire investigators could not have determined that the house fire was
arson.""1 The FSC stated that, before issuing its decision, it would
be prudent to obtain the Attorney General's advice on whether it
had jurisdiction on the matter.62 On July 29, 2011, the Attorney
55. See generally Mills & Possley, supra note 32, at Al.
56. See generally Grann, supra note 1.
57. See supra text accompanying note 28. But see Petition to Convene a Court of Inquiry
and for a Declaration to Remedy Injury to Mr. Willingham's Reputation Under the Texas
Constitution at 16-18, In re Cameron Todd Willingham (Tex. Dist. Ct. Sept. 24, 2010),
available at http://standdown.typepad.com/WILLINGHAM-Court of InquiryPetition.pdf
[hereinafter Petition to Convene a Court of Inquiry] (arguing that the jailhouse snitch's
testimony was unreliable).
58. ARSON REVIEW COMM., supra note 16, at 3.
59. About Us, TEX. FORENSIC Sc. COMM'N, http://www.fsc.state.tx.us/about.html (last
visited Nov. 14, 2010).
60. Matt Smith, Texas Governor Shakes Up Panel Probing 2004 Execution, CNN (Sept. 30,
2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-09-30/justice/texas.execution.probe-l_1willingham-case-
cameron-todd-willingham-governor-pery?_s--PM:CRIME.
61. Erin Mulvaney, Texas Forensic Panel Delays Final Decision in Willingham Arson Case,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Jan. 21, 2011, 9:33 AM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/state/
headlines/20110121-texas-forensic-panel-delays-final-decision-in-willingham-arson-case.ece.
62. See Letter from John Bradley, Presiding Officer, Texas Forensic Science Commis-
sion, to the Honorable Greg Abbott, Attorney Gen., Texas (Jan. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.fsc.state.tx.us/documents/FINAL.pdf; see also Allan Turner, Panel Questions its
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General informed the FSC that it did not have jurisdiction to con-
sider evidence in the Willingham case," but the FSC did issue a
report urging the improvement of arson investigations in Texas."
On September 24, 2010, Willingham's relatives petitioned a Tex-
as county court to hear evidence to determine whether Willingham
was factually and legally innocent. 6 5 The presiding judge, the Hon-
orable Charlie Baird, had, in the prior year, exonerated a different
man named Timothy Cole, who had been convicted of rape but
had died in prison ten years before his exoneration. Employing a
similar strategy as was successful in the Cole case, the attorneys for
Willingham's relatives argued that Judge Baird had authority to
convene a Court of Inquiry on the matter pursuant to Article
52.01 (a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.6 ' Article
52.01 (a) provides:
own jurisdiction in Willingham Review, Hous. CHRON. (Jan. 21, 2011, 6:30 AM),
http://www.chron.com/default/article/Panel-questions-its-own-jurisdiction-in-l61 3 3 01.php
(reporting that one of the commissioners moved to seek the attorney general's opinion on
this matter).
63. See Letter from Greg Abbott, Attorney Gen., Texas, to Nizam Peerwani, Presiding
Officer, Texas Forensic Science Commission (Jul. 29, 2011), available at https://
www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/opinions/50abbott/op/2011/pdf/ga0866.pdf.
64. See Addendum to the April 15, 2011 Report of the Texas Forensic Science
Commission: Willingham/Willis Investigation, Oct. 28, 2011, available at http://
content.news8austin.com/auscontent/files/WillinghamWillisReport.pdf; Report of the
Texas Forensic Science Commission: Willingham/Willis Investigation, Apr. 14, 2011, availa-
ble at http://www.fsc.state.tx.us/documents/FINALpdf; Erin Mulvaney, Report on Arson
Investigations is Approved, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 15, 2011, at A04.
65. See Petition to Convene a Court of Inquiry, supra note 57; Steven Kreytak & Chuck
Lindell, Willingham Lawyers Ask for Exoneration Hearing in Travis County, AuSTIN LEGAL (Sept.
24, 2010, 3:45 PM), http://www.statesman.com/blogs/content/shared-gen/blogs/austin/
courts/entries/2010/09/24/willingham_1awyersaskforhea.html. Scholars have drawn a
distinction between actual (or factual) and legal innocence, with the former meaning that
the defendant did not actually commit the crime and the latter meaning that the prosecu-
tion failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and without any violations of the
defendant's constitutional rights, that the defendant committed the crime. See Emily
Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. REv. 1083, 1084-89 (2011). Many of the assertions
about Willingham's alleged wrongful execution relate to his factual innocence, but the peti-
tion to convene a court of inquiry focused on legal deficits in Willingham's case-primarily
that the arson evidence that was central to the case was based on bad science. See generally
Petition to Convene a Court of Inquiry, supra (outlining the questionable nature of the
arson evidence used in Willingham's case). The Petition's focus on legal innocence is not
surprising considering that such legal arguments are as effective, if not more so, than factual
ones, and also that factual innocence is extremely difficult to prove and cannot easily be
proven conclusively, especially when there is no DNA evidence.
66. See generally In re A Court of Inquiry, No. D1-DC08-100-051 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Apr. 7,
2009), available at http://www.ipoftexas.org/pdf/OpinionOrderofCourt.pdf (exonerating
Timothy Cole).
67. See Petition to Convene a Court of Inquiry, supra note 57, at 3.
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When a judge of any district court of th[e] state, acting in his
capacity as magistrate, has probable cause to believe that an
offense has been committed against the laws of th[e] state, he
may request that the presiding judge of the administrative ju-
dicial district appoint a district judge to commence a Court of
Inquiry. 8
The attorneys also contended that "[a] Court of Inquiry is an
appropriate forum for investigating cases of wide public interest-
such as this one-whether or not a criminal offense has been
committed.""0 But a criminal offense had been committed in the
case, the attorneys asserted: Texas had committed "official oppres-
sion" by failing to recognize exculpatory evidence prior to
Willingham's execution and by subsequently refusing to
acknowledge Willingham's innocence.7 o This, the attorneys argued,
amounted to "state officials ... intentionally den [ying] or
imped[ing] ... Willingham's and his survivors' right to a remedy
for injury to his reputation under Article 1, Section 13 of the Texas
Constitution . . . and under Section 71.021 (a) of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code."7 ' These provisions provide that
"[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done
him, in his . . . person or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law,"7 2 and that "[a] cause of action for personal injury to
. . . reputation ... does not abate because of the death of the in-
jured person."73
The strategy worked, at least temporarily, as Judge Baird
launched a Court of Inquiry to determine if Willingham had been
wrongfully convicted and executed. The District Attorney swiftly
responded by filing a motion to disqualify or recuse Judge Baird.5
The state based this motion on: (1) Judge Baird's prior involve-
ment in the case as a judge for the Court of Criminal Appeals that
had upheld Willingham's conviction on direct appeal and also had
denied Willingham's petition for state habeas relief, (2) Judge
68. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 52.01 (a) (West 2006).
69. Petition to Convene a Court of Inquiry, supra note 57, at 3 (citing In re McClelland,
260 F. Supp. 182, 184 (D. Tex. 1966)).
70. See id.
71. Id. at 4.
72. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
73. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.021(a) (West 2008).
74. Dave Montgomery, Judge in Willingham Case Goes Ahead with Court of Inquiry, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 14, 2010.
75. See State's Motion forJudge to Disqualify or Recuse the Honorable Charlie Baird,
In re Cameron Todd Willingham (Tex. Dist. Ct. Oct. 4, 2010), available at http://
standdown.typepad.com/Willingham-DAMotion toRecuse-CtInquiry.pdf.
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Baird's possible bias in the case, and (3) Judge Baird's failure to
follow appropriate procedures by commencing the Court of In-
quiry himself rather than requesting the presiding judge of the
administrative judicial district to appoint a district judge to do so.
In managing the motion, Judge Baird briefly postponed the
Willingham hearing" but ultimately declined to rule on the motion
because he concluded that the District Attorney lacked standing on
the matter.7 ' However, the Third Appeals Court of Austin stayed
the proceeding," and on December 21, 2010, it granted "a writ of
mandamus to compel Judge Baird to follow the recusal procedure
outlined [under Texas law] by either recusing himself or referring
the motion to the presiding judge of the administrative judicial
district., ... Judge Baird said that he intended to forward the issue to
the presiding judge," and it is unclear when the issue of the pro-
priety of the Court of Inquiry will be resolved.
Questions continue to swirl around the Willingham case. Judge
Baird retired at the end of 2010,2 injecting yet another complica-
tion into the Court of Inquiry procedure. Judge Karen Sage
inherited the case, and the parties were scheduled to provide her
with status reports on December 9, 2011, andJanuary 9, 2012.
II. THE DIFFICULTIES OF ESTABLISHING WRONGFUL EXECUTION
The Cameron Todd Willingham case is one in which a determi-
nation of wrongful execution may be in the making. If the case
76. See id. at 3-5.
77. See Steven Kreytak, judge Postpones Willingham Case: Baird Says He Needs More Time to
Review Motion Seeking His Recusal, STATESMAN.COM (Oct. 6, 2010, 10:37 PM),
http://www.statesman.com/news/local/judge-postpones-willingham-case- 9 58 166.html.
78. See Matt Smith, Texas Judge Opens Hearing into Disputed 2004 Execution, CNN (Oct. 15,
2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-14/justice/texas.execution.probe-1_willingham-case-
texas-forensic-science-commission-cameron-todd-willingham?_s=PM:CRIME.
79. Dave Montgomery, Court Blocks Ruling in Death-Penalty Inquiry, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Oct. 14, 2010.
80. In re R. Lowell Thompson, No. 03-10-00689-CV, at I (Tex. App. Dec. 21, 2010), avail-
able at http://www.3rdcoa.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/PDFOpinion.asp?OpinionId=19 8 27 .
81. See Steven Kreytak, Appeals Court Rebukes Baird in Willingham Case: With judge
Leaving Bench, Future of Case Unclear, STATESMAN.COM (Dec. 21, 2010, 10:25 PM), http://
www.statesman.com/nevs/local/appeals-court-rebukes-baird-in-willingham-case-l 139179.html.
82. Further, Judge Baird has stated that he intends to run for the Travis County Dis-
trict Attorney post in March of 2012. See Steven Kreytak, Former judge Charlie Baird Weighs DA
Run, STATESMAN.COM (Jun. 14. 2011, 9:08 PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/local/
former-judge-charlie-baird-weighs-da-run-1 540214.html?viewAsSinglePage=true.
83. See Register of Actions, State v. Court of Inquiry, No. D-1-DC-10-1000069 (299th
Dist. C. 2010) (on file with U. Mich. J.L. Reform). There will likely be more activity in the
case in February 2012, as this Article goes to press.
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proceeds and if the Court of Inquiry indeed determines that
Willingham was innocent of murdering his three children, this will
be the first case in the United States in which an executed individ-
514
ual has been exonerated. Although this would certainly be a
landmark decision, it would not be the first time that there was a
question about the guilt of an executed individual. Questions still
linger about the guilt of other individuals who were executed prior
to Willingham-both before and after jurisdictions adopted great-
er procedural protections for capital defendants in the aftermath
of the Supreme Court's 1972 Furman v. Georgia decision, which
temporarily struck down the death penalty.85 But still, no individual
executed in the United States has been formally exonerated.86
This dearth of exonerations among executed defendants is not
necessarily the result of the exceptional accuracy of convictions in
84. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Dead Innocent: The Death Penalty Abolitionist Search for a
Wrongful Execution, 42 TULSA L. REV. 403, 404 (2006) ("Prior to this time period, there are
likely instances of wrongful executions. Yet, there is no conclusive proof that any one of the
more than one thousand inmates executed in modern times was innocent."); see also supra
note 65 (delineating the distinction between actual (or factual) innocence and legal inno-
cence). While it is difficult to conclusively establish factual innocence, a Court of Inquiry
found that Texas's Timothy Cole was factually innocent in 2009. See In re A Court of
Inquiry, at 10, 16, No. DI-DC08-100-051 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Apr. 7, 2009), available at http://
www.ipoftexas.org/pdf/OpinionOrderofCourt.pdf (concluding that "[t]he evidence is crys-
tal clear that [Cole] died in prison an innocent man"; finding "to a 100% moral, legal, and
factual certainty that he did not commit the crime for which he was convicted"; and decree-
ing him "exonerated"); supra text accompanying note 66.
85. See generally Bedau & Radelet, supra note 9 (alleging twenty-three cases of wrong-
ful execution and stating that, although, "[i]n the aftermath of Furman v. Georgia, statutory
procedures in capital cases have been extensively revised," these do not seem to have "been
introduced with reducing the risk of executing the innocent as the paramount motive"). In
1987, Professors Hugo Adam Bedau and Michael L. Radelet published a study cataloging
twenty-three instances in which they believed that innocent individuals had been wrongfully
executed. See Bedau and Radelet, supra note 9, at 72. Paul Cassell and Stephen Markman
responded by pointing out that a number of the cases that Bedau and Radelet had studied
were pre-Furman cases and by undercutting the objectivity of their study. See Stephen J.
Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41
STAN. L. REv. 121-22, 124, 126-28 (1988). Cassell and Markman concluded that there was
"no credible evidence that any innocent person has been executed" after Furman. Id. Bedau
and Radelet, however, stated that although, "[i]n the aftermath of Furman v. Georgia, statuto-
ry procedures in capital cases have been extensively revised," these do not seem to have
"been introduced with reducing the risk of executing the innocent as the paramount mo-
tive." Bedau & Radelet, supra note 9, at 89.
86. See Wiseman, supra note 6, at 695-702 (explaining that only four individuals have
been formally posthumously exonerated and that all of them died of natural causes while in
prison); see also Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 188 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It should
be noted at the outset that the dissent does not discuss a single case-not one-in which it is
clear that a person was executed for a crime he did not commit. If such an event had oc-
curred in recent years, we would not have to hunt for it; the innocent's name would be
shouted from the rooftops by the abolition lobby."). But see Bedau & Radelet, supra note 9,
at 91 (concluding that least twenty-three individuals had been wrongfully executed in the
United States by 1985).
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our criminal justice system; instead, it can be attributed to other
factors. The attorneys and media that are often essential in bring-
ing to light wrongful convictions tend to focus their resources on
the stories of those who are still alive rather than those who have
already been executed and thus cannot be saved." Additionally, it
generally becomes more difficult to prove a defendant's factual
innocence as time passes because memories fade and evidence and
witnesses disappear." Perhaps the only way to persuasively establish
innocence is through DNA evidence." However, there is often no
DNA evidence available for testing," and even when it is available,
this evidence degrades over time and could be useless by the time
the defendant is executed.'
Considering DNA's central role in exonerations, it is noteworthy
that those seeking posthumous DNA testing have had only limited
success in gaining access to this material crucial to establishing a
defendant's factual innocence.9 2 Prosecutors are often reluctant to
allow DNA testing related to a case in which they have already ob-
tained a conviction, which is likely due to their incentives to obtain
and maintain convictions." Prosecutors have a professional incen-
tive to obtain convictions because prosecutors' offices often
emphasize conviction rates and tie these to a prosecutor's profes-
87. See Kirchmeier, supra note 84, at 429. As one commentator has stated, "attorneys
are appointed to represent living death row inmates, while courts do not provide resources
for dead inmates." Id.
88. See id.
89. See Wiseman, supra note 6, at 689 (asserting that "DNA can offer-unlike the
recanting of ajailhouse snitch or another individual's post-trial confession to the crime-
conclusive evidence of actual innocence"). However, while DNA evidence can be "uniquely
probative" of a defendant's innocence, see Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN.
L. REv. 1629, 1647 (2008), it is not conclusive. For example, the defendant may not have left
behind any of his DNA, and the trace DNA evidence examined could belong to his partner
or an innocent individual. SeeJonathan J. Koehler, DNA Matches and Statistics: Important Ques-
tions, Surprising Answers, 76 JUDICATURE 222, 224 (1993) (noting that a "reported [DNA]
match may not be a 'true' match" because laboratories can make mistakes; that DNA pat-
terns may be shared by other individuals; and that, "even if the defendant is the source of
the trace, there may be an innocent explanation").
90. See Bruce P. Smith, The History of Wrongful Execution, 56 HASTINGs L.J. 1185, 1219
(2005).
91. See id. As one court has stated, "DNA testing may help prevent some ... near-
tragedies in the future; but it can only be used in that minority of cases involving
recoverable, and relevant, DNA samples." United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256,
264 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002).
92. Anne-Marie Moyes, Note, Assessing the Risk of Executing the Innocent: A Case for Allow-
ing Access to Physical Evidence for Posthumous DNA Testing, 55 VAND. L. REv. 953, 958-59
(2002).
93. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims
of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REv. 125, 129-32 (2004) ("Empirical proof suggests that prosecutors
have consented to DNA tests in less than fifty percent of the cases in which testing later ex-
onerated the inmate.").
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sional advancement."4 Prosecutors have an incentive to maintain
the convictions they have obtained because overturned convictions
could undermine the credibility of the prosecutor's office and also
that particular prosecutor. These professional incentives are mag-
nified by a political landscape in which most chief prosecutors at
the municipal and county levels are elected and in which being
viewed as tough on crime is often critical for reelection.96 Psycho-
logical barriers may also come into play, as prosecutors may find it
difficult to admit mistakes and acknowledge instances of wrongful
conviction." Further, prosecutors tend to become aligned with
crime victims, which can skew their objectivity."
Like prosecutors, courts are often reluctant to provide access to
DNA evidence for posthumous testing.99 Plaintiffs seeking access to
this material commonly rely on a state's Freedom of Information
Act or its common law right of access to physical evidence in closed
criminal cases. 00 This avenue for access has not always been suc-
cessful, though, because it often depends to a significant extent on
judicial discretion.o' While some courts have, on occasion, provid-
ed plaintiffs access to DNA evidence for posthumous testing-but
more frequently when the government does not oppose it 2
other courts have refused to provide such access.'" For example,
when a Virginia judge was faced with a request for access to DNA
evidence for posthumous testing, he concluded that no public in-
terest justified granting such access and explained that, even if the
DNA results established that the defendant had been wrongfully
convicted, that "would have no bearing on the fairness of the death
penalty as it is now administered or on the public confidence of
the criminal justice system" today because greater procedural
safeguards are in place today than at the time of the executed de-
fendant's conviction. 4 An additional hurdle that a plaintiff must
overcome in this regard is that, like prosecutors, courts' reputa-
tions are on the line in these cases, and a determination of
94. See id. at 134-38.
95. See id. at 136-38.
96. See id. at 151-57.
97. See id. at 138-47; Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister oflustice: Preaching to
the Unconverted From the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REv. 35, 51-53 (2009).
98. See Medwed, supra note 93, at 145-46.
99. See Smith, supra note 90, at 1215, 1219.
100. See Moyes, supra note 92, at 961.
101. See id. at 970.
102. See id. at 971-72.
103. See id. at 964-67.
104. Id. at 967.
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wrongful execution could significantly damage public confidence
in the judiciary.o 5
Plaintiffs have proceeded down other paths in the hopes of ob-
taining essential DNA evidence for posthumous testing. They have
sought access under First Amendment "freedom of the press" ar-
guments,]os a state law granting judges discretion to donate
evidence in closed criminal cases to charities,"o' and a state law
providing judges authority to grant discovery or investigate a po-
tential claim.'08 For the most part, these additional approaches
have proved fruitless to those seeking to gain access to this biologi-
cal material.
One of the primary reasons that courts have been hesitant to
grant posthumous or any post-conviction DNA testing is the state's
interest in finality." The Supreme Court has continuously reiterat-
ed in its habeas corpus cases, and courts have also articulated in
the post-conviction DNA testing context, that finality is important
for a number of reasons. It is central to deterring criminal activity
because, if would-be offenders do not expect that they will swiftly
and quite surely be punished after engaging in criminal activity,
they are much more likely to commit criminal acts."o This deter-
rent effect is diminished if the individual contemplating criminal
activity believes there is a chance that he will "escape punishment
through repetitive collateral attacks" on his conviction."' Finality
also aids in the rehabilitation of criminals because, if an offender
believes there is a chance that his conviction will be overturned,
105. See id. at 972.
106. See id. at 975-77.
107. See id. at 980-82.
108. See id. at 984; cf Lois Romano, When DNA Meets Death Row, It's the System That's Test-
ed, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2003, at A01 (noting that in September 2003, the Texas Attorney
General's office denied the Washington Post's request to obtain DNA evidence in a death
penalty case and that in December 2003, ajudge agreed to dismiss all pending claims on the
issue).
109. Although courts have identified a number of advantages to maintaining this inter-
est in finality, see infra text accompanying notes 112-119, one scholar has argued that the
new science of DNA evidence may have undercut many of these advantages. See Edward K.
Cheng, Reenvisioning Law Through the DNA Lens, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. Am. L. 649, 650
(2005) (stating that, "[a]s a historical matter, a strict finality doctrine made practical sense"
but that, "[w]hen the new evidence is DNA... the calculus changes"). Further, one might
even argue that post-conviction DNA testing has the potential to further finality interests by
confirming the guilt of those already convicted. See, e.g., Maria Glod & Michael D. Shear,
DNA Tests Confirm Guilt of Executed Man, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2006, at A01 (reporting that
the post-execution testing of Roger Coleman's DNA confirmed that he was indeed guilty of
the crimes for which he had been convicted and executed).
110. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452-53 (1986); see also Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 309 (1989) ("Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent
effect.").
111. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 452-53.
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this could prevent him from accepting that he has been justly con-
victed and punished and that he needs to be rehabilitated.1 1 2
Finality is likewise important in sparing victims the pain of having
to endure further proceedings related to the crime that has affect-
ed their lives."'3 It is also important in furthering what has been
termed the government's "punitive interests."' The government
may face difficulties in attempting to retry a defendant who was
freed on a successive petition due to witnesses' fading memories
and the disappearance of other evidence resulting from the pas-
sage of time."' And the government's inability to achieve a second
conviction has been identified as an unacceptable result if the de-
fendant was indeed guilty."6 Finality also frees judges, prosecutors,
and attorneys from a deluge of collateral attacks so that they can
instead focus their time and energy on trying criminal cases in the
first instance. 1 7 Lastly, finality is important in establishing stability
in the criminal justice system so that imprisonment and punish-
ment are not constantly under attack by appeal or new litigation."
While difficulties such as gaining access to DNA evidence have
undoubtedly contributed to the lack of conclusive determinations
of wrongful execution in this country, there have been several
instances in which a convicted defendant who died in prison of
natural causes was posthumously exonerated. For example, Frank
Lee Smith, who was convicted in 1985 for raping and murdering
an eight-year-old girl, died of cancer while still on death row in
2000."' He was exonerated approximately ten months later when
the sole eyewitness in his case recanted and DNA results cleared his
112. See id.
113. See Seth F. Kreimer, Truth Machines and Consequences: The Light and Dark Sides of "Ac
curacy" in CriminalJustice, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L. 655, 655-56 (2005) (explaining that
prosecutors regard the interest of finality as important in part because allowing a convicted
criminal to continue to challenge his conviction is "a disservice to the victims").
114. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 453; see also Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collat-
eral Attack on Criminal judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 148-149 (1970) (arguing that the
proliferation of collateral attacks wastes resources that would be better used for trying new
cases).
115. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 453.
116. See id.
117. See id.; Friendly, supra note 114, at 148-49.
118. See Peter Gordon Ingram, Justiciability, 39 AM.J.JURIS. 353, 372 (1994) (noting that
"integrity and stability of the system ... is ... the main justification of the principle of finali-
ty"); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (stating that finality "is essential to the
operation of our criminal justice system").
119. Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence and
Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 547, 551 (2002).
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name. 2 1 Similarly, Louis Greco and Henry Tameleo, convicted of
murder in 1965 and sentenced to death,12' both died in prison, but
they were exonerated over a decade later when evidence came to
light that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had assisted in fram-
ing them. 22 John Jeffers was convicted of murder in 1975 and died
from a drug overdose in 1983 while still imprisoned.'22 Nearly two
decades later, in 2001, authorities reopened his case after another
individual confessed to the crime, and Jeffers's name was cleared,
although he was not officially exonerated.'2 1 In 2009, Texas exon-
erated Timothy Cole, who had spent thirteen years in prison for
the crime of rape but had died when an asthma attack caused him
to go into cardiac arrest in 1999.125 DNA testing that was triggered
by another's confession to the crime cleared Cole, and Judge Baird
decreed Cole innocent and thus exonerated in 2009.126 Governor
Perry granted him a full posthumous pardon in March 2010.127
In addition to these posthumous exonerations, there have
been an overwhelming number of determinations of wrongful
conviction. As of October 2011, there have been 289 documented
post-conviction DNA exonerations in the United States.'2 ' Further,
according to the Death Penalty Information Center, "over 130
people have been released from death row" since 1973 because
significant evidence arose indicating that they were innocent. 29
120. Id. Smith was formally exonerated when a county circuit court judge granted the
state's motion to vacate and set aside the conviction. See Wiseman, supra note 6, at 699 (cit-
ing Florida v. Smith, No. 85-4654 CF10A (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 22, 2000)).
121. Stanley Z. Fisher, Convictions of Innocent Persons in Massachusetts: An Overview, 12
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 41 (2002).
122. Id. at 41-43 & n.185. Greco was exonerated when the District Attorney's office
filed a motion to "drop all charges against Greco posthumously," and Tameleo was suppos-
edly exonerated in a similar manner. See Wiseman, supra note 6, at 700.
123. Eugene R. Milhizer, Confessions after Connelly: An Evidentiary Solution for Excluding
Unreliable Confessions, 81 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 16 n.91 (2008).
124. Id. There is no evidence that Jeffers was officially exonerated, although someone
else has been convicted for the same crime for which Jeffers had been convicted more than
twenty years before. SeeWiseman, supra note 6, at 701.
125. See Wiseman, supra note 6, at 696; Peggy Fikac, Perry Pardons Rape Convict Posthu-
mously, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 2, 2010, at B1.
126. See Wiseman, supra note 6, at 696-97.
127. See id. at 697.
128. See Innocence Project Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJEcT, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (providing a count of U.S.
post-conviction DNA exonerations as ofJanuary 2012).
129. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY,
(2010), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. Further,
"[f]rom 1973-1999, there was an average of 3.1 exonerations per year," and "[flrom 2000-
2007, there has been an average of 5 exonerations per year." Id.
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III. POSSIBLE REMEDIES FOR WRONGFUL EXECUTION
As DNA exonerations become even more prevalent, and as
courts become more open to reviewing the validity of executions,
there will be a question of what remedies are available to those
wrongfully executed, or at least the families, friends, and legal
heirs of those wrongfully executed. Indeed, depending on the out-
come of the inquiry into Cameron Todd Willingham's innocence,
Willingham's execution may soon push this question to the fore-
front of the Texas courts' and legislature's agendas.
Those wrongfully convicted and incarcerated have sought com-
pensation through common law tort and federal civil rights claims,
as well as wrongful conviction statutes if available within the rele-
vant jurisdiction. As many scholars have explained, however,
neither traditional tort actions nor civil rights suits have proven
satisfactory in providing compensation for exonerees.3 0 These liti-
gants frequently are unable to establish liability, and even those
who are able to overcome this substantial hurdle often recover very
little.131 Those seeking a remedy for wrongful execution will likely
have an equally, if not more, difficult time recovering. Not only will
there likely be greater hurdles to establishing the executed indi-
vidual's factual or legal innocence, but the common law tort and
civil rights claims become more complicated when the individual
at the center of the suit-he who was wrongfully executed-is de-
ceased. Further, state and federal compensation statutes are not
generally aimed at remedying wrongful executions.
A. Common Law Tort Claims
Exonerees who have sought redress through common law tort
systems have faced significant barriers. First, it is often difficult to
identify an individual or entity that can be blamed for one's
130. See Adele Bernhard, justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to Compensate Individu-
als Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 703, 707 (2004)
[hereinafter Bernhard, justice Still Fails] (explaining that few exonorees have been compen-
sated by way of torts or civil rights claims); Adele Bernhard, When justice Fails: Indemnification
for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 86 (1999) [hereinafter Bernhard,
When justice Fails] ("Neither the common law torts of wrongful arrest nor malicious prosecu-
tion, nor the Civil Rights Act of 1871 provide redress."); Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence,
Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 35 (2005).
131. See Garrett, supra note 130, at 49. Some claimants, though, have received substan-
tial verdicts or settlements. See id. at 35.
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wrongful conviction and incarceration.12 Ordinarily, it is a conflu-
ence of factors that leads to a wrongful conviction.'3 3 This creates
difficulties in determining whom to name as defendants. While this
confluence of factors problem could hinder an exoneree's proof of
but-for causation, tort law ordinarily allows liability based on the
substantial factor test as well.134 Thus, if an exoneree could establish
that the defendant's wrong was a substantial factor in bringing
about the exoneree's injury-his wrongful conviction and incar-
ceration-he could possibly prevail, so long as the defendant did
not have a valid defense to the claim. ' While the causation hurdle
could possibly be overcome, finding an identifiable wrong on
which to base the tort claim has proven problematic.
1. The Most Promising Tort Claims
Most exonerees that have pursued tort claims have based them
on the wrong of malicious prosecution.'" To prevail on such a
claim, the exoneree must establish that he has been exonerated
and also that the prosecutor initiated the proceeding with malice-
meaning without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other
than to bring an offender to justice.'3  Probable cause is a low
standard, and the defendant-prosecutor will likely be able to estab-
lish this as a complete defense to the allegation.'3  Moreover, in
many jurisdictions, the exoneree's underlying conviction, even if
reversed, constitutes conclusive evidence that there was probable
cause for the initial prosecution.'" Aside from probable cause, the
plaintiff also faces the difficult task of establishing that the prose-
cutor initiated the prosecution for a nefarious purpose-an
132. See Bernhard, justice Still Fails, supra note 130, at 722-23; Bernhard, When justice
Fails, supra note 130, at 86.
133. See Bernhard, When justice Fails, supra note 130, at 86.
134. See Teressa E. Ravenell, Cause and Conviction: The Role of Causation in § 1983 Wrong-
Jul Conviction Claims, 81 TEMP. L. REv. 689, 719-21 (2008).
135. See id. But see Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Thoughts on Damages for Wrongful Convic-
tions, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 127, 150 n.96 (2010) (expressing doubt that showing defendant
was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury would suffice to establish liability).
136. See Garrett, supra note 130, at 50-51.
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1977); see also Bernhard, When justice
Fails, supra note 130, at 86 (stating that, to establish claims for "malicious prosecution,
claimants must prove not simply that they were arrested and prosecuted and that the pro-
ceeding was eventually terminated in their favor, but also that there was no probable cause
for their arrest in the first place and that they were prosecuted with actual malice.").
138. See Michael Avery, Obstacles to Litigating Civil Claims for Wrongful Conviction: An Over-




element on which the evidence would likely be exceedingly sparse.
If the plaintiff instead alleges malicious prosecution against a non-
prosecutor defendant, such as a police officer, that defendant will
likely argue that he did not initiate the prosecution."o While in ex-
treme cases a police officer could be considered to have initiated
the prosecution despite not being a prosecutor, this is really the
case only if the plaintiff can establish, for example, that the officer
deliberately misrepresented or omitted material facts to the prose-
cutor and the prosecutor was not aware of this misrepresentation
such that the prosecution was proximately caused by the officer's
misconduct. 141
Some exonerees pursue other common law tort claims such as
false imprisonment,1 4 1 intentional infliction of emotional distress,"3
or legal malpractice.144 To establish a false imprisonment claim, the
exoneree must ordinarily prove that the named defendant intend-
ed to confine him, that this defendant's act caused the
confinement, and that the exoneree was conscious of the confine-
ment or was harmed by it.14" Although it would seem relatively easy
for one who was wrongfully convicted and incarcerated to establish
these elements, the defendants in these types of cases usually have
a valid claim of privilege.14 6 The confinement is so privileged if
there was probable cause for the arrest, which, as in the malicious
prosecution context, is a relatively low standard.
Exonerees have a similarly difficult time establishing a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, for which they general-
ly must show that the defendant intended to inflict emotional
distress, that he engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct, and
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See Bernhard, When justice Fails, supra note 130, at 86.
143. See Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 226-29 (D. Mass. 2007).
144. See Bernhard, When Justice Fails, supra note 130, at 86. In the Willingham Petition
to Convene a Court of Inquiry, the petitioners seemed to allege a tort somewhat more pe-
ripheral to the wrong of execution: injury to reputation. See Petition to Convene a Court of
Inquiry, supra note 57, at 2-4, 57; supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
145. SeeRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 (1965).
146. See Daniel S. Kahn, Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Burden of Proof in
Wrongful Conviction Claims Under State Compensation Statutes, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 123,
133 (2010) ("Because actions for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment both re-
quire a showing of intent on the part of the government, as well as an absence of probable
cause for the arrest, and are limited by the same immunity protections as § 1983 claims, they
are exceedingly difficult to maintain."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 118, 145
(1977); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007) ("The sort of unlawful detention
remediable by the tort of false imprisonment is detention without legal process.. .
147. See Bernhard, When justice Fails, supra note 130, at 86.
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that this conduct caused severe emotional distress to the plaintiff.4 8
While intentional infliction of emotional distress is difficult to es-
tablish in any case,"' it can be especially difficult when exonerees
or their heirs must prove that defendants such as government offi-
cials intentionally tried to cause a wrongful conviction or fear of
one. This is similar to the difficulty of establishing malice in the
malicious prosecution context.'50 That said, at least one court has
found the government liable for intentional infliction of emotional
distress when FBI agents were found to have intentionally framed
individuals who were later exonerated. 5'
Exonerees again run into difficulties in trying to pursue legal
malpractice claims-where they are attributing their wrongful con-
victions and incarcerations to their defense attorneys'
ineffectiveness. An exoneree is unlikely to prevail on such a claim
because, in addition to establishing that his attorney was ineffective
in representing him, the exoneree must establish that this defect
caused the wrongful conviction and incarceration-an element
notoriously difficult to establish in any legal malpractice suit."
2. Immunities
Aside from exonerees' difficulties in establishing prima facie
common law tort claims, their chances of prevailing on any of the-
se claims are even slimmer because, for the most part, all of the
individuals and entities that they might allege as defendants enjoy
some type of immunity. The common law doctrine of sovereign
immunity'53 ordinarily insulates state and federal governments
148. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 46 (1977). Recklessness ordinarily satisfies
the intent requirement for this tort. See id.
149. See Michael J. Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 575, 582
(2003) (noting that "it is difficult to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress").
150. See supra text accompanying notes 136-141.
151. See Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 226-29 (D. Mass. 2007) (con-
cluding that the plaintiffs, which included Tameleo and Greco, see supra text accompanying
notes 121-122, established a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the
government).
152. See Bernhard, When justice Fails, supra note 130, at 90-92.
153. Some courts have distinguished "sovereign immunity" from "governmental im-
munity," and other courts have used the labels interchangeably. See, e.g., Wichita Falls State
Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 n.3 (Tex. 2003) (stating that sovereign immunity and
governmental immunity "involve two distinct concepts"-the former referring to the State's
and its divisions' immunity from suit and liability and the latter referring to the protection
of "political subdivisions of the State"-yet "[c]ourts often use the terms ... interchangea-
bly"); Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 517-19 (Ky. 2001) (describing "sovereign immunity" as
a common law-derived concept that precludes suits against the state and its public officials
unless the government has waived the immunity; describing "governmental immunity" as
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from suit unless the immunity has been statutorily or judicially
waived. 5 4 Although the vast majority of states have enacted statutes
waiving this traditional blanket of immunity, most states retain im-
munity in particular circumstances." Texas, for example, allows
suits against it when "a condition or use of tangible personal or
related property" caused personal injury or death and the state
would, if it were a private person, be liable to the claimant under
Texas law.'56 And the federal government has limited its sovereign
immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act, providing that it may
be held liable for injuries "caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting with-
in the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable.""
However, the federal government has not waived its immunity in
the instance that the claim arises from the employee abiding by a
government statute or regulation or that employee's exercise of a
discretionary function on behalf of the government.5 8
Not only do the state and federal governments enjoy immunity,
but the government officials whom an exoneree might want to tar-
get in a common law claim are also often immune from suit.
Judges have absolute immunity for anything carried out in their
"the public policy, derived from the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity, that limits
imposition of tort liability on a government agency"; and stating that a number of courts use
the terms interchangeably). For purposes of this Article, any differences between the two
labels are unimportant.
154. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 715-16 (2000).
155. See id. at 716.
156. TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (West 2009) (providing that the state
is liable for damages and injuries "proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the
negligence of an employee acting within his scope of employment if' it "arises from the
operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment" and "the employee
would be personally liable to the claimant according to Texas law," or, it is "caused by a
condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were
it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law").
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1) (2006).
158. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). This provision of the Act provides that the waiver of im-
munity does not apply to:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercis-
ing due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute
or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency
or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.
Id. The Supreme Court has clarified this discretionary function exception somewhat by
stating that it "insulates the Government from liability if the action challenged in the case
involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment." Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S.
531, 537 (1988).
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official capacities. 59 Thus, a judge cannot be sued by an exoneree
for a questionable decision on the bench. Prosecutors have abso-
lute immunity for acts committed within their traditional roles of
initiating, instituting, or continuing criminal proceedings.60 Simi-
larly, testifying witnesses enjoy absolute immunity."' Police officers
often have qualified immunity when acting within the scope of
their authority.'62 Under federal law, officers are immune from suit
unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or con-
stitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known."' Some jurisdictions have even cloaked public defenders
with immunity in order to acknowledge their often limited re-
sources and to encourage their unfettered professional discretion
on matters.164
3. Survival and Wrongful Death Suits
While individuals who have been wrongfully convicted and in-
carcerated have at least occasionally prevailed on their claims of
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and legal malpractice, it is unclear whether
those filing claims on behalf of or in relation to individuals wrong-
fully executed would have similar success. Unlike the claims of
those wrongfully convicted and incarcerated, common law tort
claims related to those wrongfully executed would most likely have
to be pursued through survival and wrongful death suits.
Although historically an individual's claim in tort died with him,
states have enacted survival suits under which a decedent's estate
may recover for the tortious act that caused the decedent's death.1
159. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D(2) (1997).
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 656 (1997); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 653, cmt. e (1997).
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588 (1997) (providing immunity to defa-
mation claims). The Restatement (Second) asserts that testifying witnesses are essential to
the administration of justice, therefore absolute immunity is vital so that they are truthful
and not in fear of defamation suits as a result of their testimony. See id., cmt. a.
162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D (3) (1997).
163. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see Bernhard, justice Still Fails, supra
note 130, at 725.
164. See, e.g., Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 777 (Minn. 1993) (stating that providing
immunity for public defenders "best serves the indigent population" by preserving public
defender resources; "aids in the recruitment" of qualified public defenders; and "preserves
the criminal justice system which relies upon the judge, prosecutor and public defender as
essential participants"); Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 407 N.Y.S.2d 103, 105 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1978) ("We perceive no valid reason to extend this immunity to state and federal prosecu-
tors and judges and to withhold it from state-appointed and state-subsidized defenders.").
165. SeeDosS, supra note 154, at 803-04.
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Thus, survival statutes extend the life of the tort claim that the de-
cedent would have had against the tortfeasor so that the decedent's
estate may recover what the decedent could have recovered had he
sued at the time of his death.66 Recovery under a survival statute
varies by jurisdiction, but such recovery could include damages for
the decedent's pain and suffering resulting from the defendant's
tort, funeral expenses, and even punitive damages.'67 Moreover,
some jurisdictions have included in pain and suffering damages
those resulting from the decedent's awareness that he would soon
die.'" Under the survival statute in Willingham's home state of
Texas, courts have allowed recovery for the decedent's pain and
suffering just prior to his demise, his mental anguish prior to his
death, property damage, punitive damages, and medical and fu-
neral expenses when they are paid by the decedent's estate. 9
It seems, then, that in most jurisdictions the wrongfully executed
individual's estate would be able to step into the decedent's shoes
and pursue the common law tort claims that the decedent would
have had. In this sense, the estate's claims would closely resemble
the claims of those wrongfully convicted and incarcerated: claims
of malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and legal malpractice. What exactly the de-
cedent's estate could recover is less certain. Damages for pain and
suffering, when available, could potentially be significant. Re-
searchers have studied the emotional trials that death row inmates
suffer, which are often in excess of what an ordinary inmate suf-
fers.17 Punitive damages, too, might be even greater in a wrongful
166. See id. at 804-05.
167. See id. at 805-06.
168. See, e.g., Nelson v. Dolan, 434 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Neb. 1989) ("A decedent's repre-
sentative unquestionably may recover for pain and suffering experienced in a brief interval
between injury and death .... We see no intrinsic or logical barrier to recovery for the fear
experienced during a period in which the decedent is uninjured but aware of an impending
death" (citations omitted)).
169. See Karl L. Rubinstein, Personal Injuries and the Texas Survival Statute: The Case for Re-
covery ofDamages for aDecedent'sLost Future Earnings, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 49, 53-54 (1980).
170. See Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and Execution Consti-
tute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REv. 147, 162-63 (1998) (explaining
that "mental strain is the most obvious collateral consequence experienced by capital de-
fendants on death row for an inordinate period of time," that "research on the impact of
[the typical conditions of death row] confinement indicates that inmates exhibit several
emotional and psychological stages," and that "capital defendants have been described as
experiencing a 'living death"'); Avi Brisman, "Docile Bodies" or Rebellious Spirits?: Issues of Time
and Power in the Waiver and Withdrawal of Death Penalty Appeals, 43 VAL. U.L. REv. 459, 475-77
(2009) (explaining that "the prolonged anticipation of death in a (relatively) known man-
ner at an uncertain time under ... austere conditions ... may be considered one of the
most stressful of all human experiences."); see also Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 48
Hous. L. REv. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1751784 (noting
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execution case due to the severity of death as a punishment. Medi-
cal damages would likely be insignificant so long as the decedent
was kept healthy prior to that final moment of lethal injection or
other deadly act.17 ' But the availability of any of these damages is
uncertain, considering that a wrongfully executed individual's es-
tate would still face the same difficulties in recovering in tort as
those wrongfully convicted and incarcerated.
While survival statutes provide a means by which an individual's
tort claims may survive his death, wrongful death statutes provide
an avenue by which a decedent's survivors may recover for their
own injuries arising out of the decedent's death.'7 ' For example,
the widow of a decedent could possibly bring a wrongful death suit
against a defendant for pecuniary harms she suffered as a result of
her husband's death.'7 3 These damages could include his loss of
earnings and even funeral expenses.' 4 Under the Texas wrongful
death statute, for example, courts allow recovery for the portions
of lost earnings that the decedent would have likely contributed to
the beneficiaries, as well as personal expenses, such as medical and
that "some offenders suffer guilt or distress as a result of committing their crimes" and that
"they are often stigmatized, especially when criminally convicted"). See generally Amy Smith,
Not "Waiving" But Drowning: The Anatomy of Death Row Syndrome and Volunteering for Execution,
17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 237 (2008) (describing the psychological experiences of death row
inmates and advocating that further research be conducted in the area). The particular
psychological and emotional injuries that death row inmates suffer are characterized as
symptoms of the "death row syndrome." See Smith, supra, at 242; Carol S. Steiker & Jordan
M. Steiker, A Tale of Two Nations: Implementation of the Death Penalty in "Executing" Versus "Sym-
bolic" States in the United States, 84 TEx. L. REv. 1869, 1919 (2006) (defining the "death row
syndrome" as "the psychological effect on capital defendants serving extraordinarily lengthy
stays on death row under a putative sentence of death, whether or not execution ever actual-
ly occurs"). While this syndrome has not been recognized by the American Psychiatric
Society or the American Psychological Association, and while it has not been included in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV, the syndrome, and its relative, the
"death row phenomenon," have been recognized by scholars and international courts. See,
e.g., Smith, supra, at 242 (discussing the syndrome), Steiker & Steiker, supra, at 1919 (same);
Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44-45 (1989) (refusing to grant an
extradition to the United States because of the probability that the defendant would signifi-
candy suffer from the "death row phenomenon").
171. But see Brief for Petitioners at 43-45, Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (arguing that
that the three-drug cocktail of sodium pentothal, pancuronium bromide, and potassium
chloride-which is commonly used to carry out lethal injection-"create[s] an unnecessary
risk of excruciating pain" because administering potassium chloride to an individual who is
not anesthetized will cause severe pain; state procedures for administering the anesthetic of
sodium pentothal were likely often ineffective; and the administration of pancuronium
bromide would cause the individual to appear "peaceful and relaxed, even while experienc-
ing the terror and agony of conscious suffocation").
172. See DOBBS, supra note 154, at 804.
173. See id. at 808.
174. See id. at 808-10.
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funeral expenses, if paid by the beneficiaries. "' The decedent's
spouse may recover for his or her loss of attention, care, counsel,
and services;17 6 and the decedent's children may recover for their
loss of "nurture, care, moral and mental training, and educa-
tion."" To establish a claim for wrongful death in any jurisdiction,
though, the claimant must establish an underlying tort" -not an
easy feat in the instance of wrongful conviction, let alone wrongful
execution.
B. Civil Rights Actions
Wrongfully convicted and incarcerated individuals have faced
similar difficulties when bringing civil rights claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.179 This section of the U.S. Code authorizes individu-
als to bring suit against "persons".o who, under the color of state
law, have deprived them "of any rights, privileges, or immunities
175. See Rubinstein, supra note 169, at 53.
176. See id.
177. Id. Before 1963, there was some confusion in Texas about the distinction between
wrongful death and survival suits. See id. at 52. The 1963 case of Landers v. B.F Goodrich Co.,
369 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. 1963), however, clarified that the two actions are distinct under Texas
law. See id.
178. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West 2011) (providing for a wrongful
death claim against any individual whose "wrongful act or neglect" caused the death of a
person); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.002(a) & (c) (West 2009) ("An action for
actual damages arising from an injury that causes an individual's death may be brought if...
the injury was caused by the person's ... wrongful act, neglect, carelessness, unskillfulness,
or default."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693 (1976) ("One who by reason of his
tortious conduct is liable to one spouse for illness or other bodily harm is subject to liability
to the other spouse for the resulting loss of the society and services of the first spouse, in-
cluding impairment of capacity for sexual intercourse, and for reasonable expense incurred
by the second spouse in providing medical treatment."). This requirement should not be
confused with merging a wrongful death claim and survival claim, as some courts have de-
termined that "wrongful death is a cause of action distinct from any underlying tort claims";
it "does not belong to the deceased or even to a decedent's estate." Lawrence v. Manor, 273
S.W.3d 525, 527 (Mo. 2009).
179. Bernhard, WhenJustice Fails, supra note 130, at 73 (noting that "people who have
been convicted and incarcerated for crimes they did not commit are precluded from
recovering damages in a court of law by the inflexibility of tort law and civil rights
doctrine-despite later exoneration"); see Bernhard, justice Still Fails, supra note 130, at 707
(noting how exonerees have been largely unsuccessful in receiving compensation through
civil rights suits). Exonerees could also theoretically bring Bivens claims against the U.S.
government, and approximately the same analysis as for § 1983 would apply. See, e.g.,
Goutam U. Jois, Pearson, lqbal, and Procedural judicial Activism, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 901,
904-05 n.10 (2010) (noting that the qualified immunity analysis has been treated similarly
in the § 1983 and Bivens contexts).
180. Courts have interpreted the term "person" to exclude states and the arms of the
state, including state officials sued in their official capacities. See Will v. Mich. Dept. of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71 (1989).
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secured by the Constitution and laws."'"' To establish a deprivation
of rights on which to base a § 1983 action, exonerees typically rely
on either the Fourth, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments, or a com-
bination of these amendments' constitutional guarantees. 2
However, exonerees might also allege claims pursuant to the
Eighth Amendment.'13 Regardless of the constitutional or statutory
provision on which the § 1983 claim is based, the particular con-
figurations of the claims remain somewhat amorphous and
malleable. In theory, courts analyze many of these claims against a
"background of tort liability."1 4 The circuits are divided, though,
on whether this means that § 1983 claims are confined by the limi-
185tations of common law tort claims.
1. Due Process Claims
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide that no person
shall be deprived "of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."1 " In the criminal context, these provisions have been in-
terpreted to secure a defendant's right to a fair trial, and § 1983
claimants have focused on this guarantee to allege a variety of
claims including Brady violations, suggestive eyewitness identifica-
181. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
182. Ravenell, supra note 134, at 701.
183. See infra text accompanying notes 231-245. Additionally, exonerees might allege
claims pursuant to the First Amendment for a conviction that "was the result of retaliation
by law enforcement against the exercise of rights of free expression." See Avery, supra note
138, at 444-45.
184. Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 709 (1999) (quot-
ing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dept. of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
185. See Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 2004) ("The Courts of Ap-
peals have taken somewhat inconsistent positions regarding how close the connection must
be between common law tort doctrine and claims tinder § 1983."). But see SHELDON H.
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIEs LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 3:4
(2010) (stating that, while "[t]ort concepts may sometimes be helpful by analogy in deter-
mining the scope of liability under § 1983, ... they should not be determinative" and
asserting that "the Supreme Court has several times indicated in connection with the rela-
tionship of tort law to § 1983, federal law is ultimately what is being interpreted, federal
purposes and interests are at stake, and these are often very different from tort law purposes
and interests"). In Pierce v. Gilchrist, the Tenth Circuit joined the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits in "rejecting the view that a plaintiff does not state a claim actionable un-
der § 1983 unless he satisfies the requirements of an analogous common law tort." 359 U.S.
at 1290.
186. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
WINTER 2012] Remedying Wrongful Execution
tion procedures, coerced confessions, and fabrication of evi-
dence.8 7
Under Brady v. Maryland,""' the prosecution must provide the de-
fense with all material exculpatory evidence.'" Further, police
officers may not misrepresent, fail to document, or hide such evi-
dence from the defense.o To establish a Brady violation on which
to base a § 1983 claim, an exoneree must show not only that excul-
patory evidence was withheld but also that "there is a reasonable
probability that, [had the evidence been disclosed to the defense],
the result of the proceeding would have been different."'0 ' One
scholar has described this requirement as akin to the typical "sub-
stantial factor" test of factual causation in tort law.M When the
most egregious evidence of innocence has been withheld, this cau-
sation element may be rather easy to establish, ', but it becomes
more difficult to make out this element as the evidence withheld
becomes "more peripheral to the jury's verdict."' 4 Moreover, a
handful of federal courts have made it even tougher for exonerees
to bring civil claims based on Brady violations in certain cases by
requiring claimants to prove that, when the claim is alleged against
police officers, the violation was made in bad faith.15
187. See Avery, supra note 138, at 446-51; Bernhard, justice Still Fails, supra note 130, at
726-38; Garrett, supra note 130, at 54-55.
188. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
189. See id. at 87; see also Garrett, supra note 130, at 69. Courts have disagreed on wheth-
er these civil Brady claims are based on procedural or substantive due process guarantees. See
Avery, supra note 138, at 446. One scholar has stated that "a cause of action for [the failure
to disclose exculpatory evidence], at least in the opinions of the federal courts, is shrouded
in doctrinal confusion." Id. at 446.
190. See Garrett, supra note 130, at 69 ("This watershed case requires prosecutors to
provide the defense with all material favorable evidence, and also prohibits police from
misrepresenting, failing to document, or hiding evidence from the defense.").
191. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); see also Garrett, supra note 130, at
71 (referring to this requirement as a showing of "materiality" or "prejudice").
192. See Garrett, supra note 130, at 71.
193. See id. at 72.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Villasana v. Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 2004) ("Brady ensures that
the defendant will obtain relief from a conviction tainted by the State's nondisclosure of
materially favorable evidence, regardless of fault, but the recovery of § 1983 damages re-
quires proof that a law enforcement officer other than the prosecutor intended to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial.");Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656, 662 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
("The difficulty of trying to sort out such everyday communications between prosecutor and
police underscores the need to insist at a minimum that an actual bad faith deprivation of
due process rights be alleged."); see also Garrett, supra note 130, at 73. But see Tennison v.
San Francisco, 570 F.3d 1078, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that a § 1983 plaintiff need
not show bad faith to establish a Brady violation by police officers but that the plaintiff must
instead show "deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for an accused's rights or for
the truth in withholding evidence from prosecutors"); but cf Jean, 221 F.3d at 660 (explain-
ing that "to speak of the duty binding police officers as a Brady duty is simply incorrect").
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Exonerees alleging § 1983 claims based on suggestive eyewitness
identification procedures might similarly face difficulties in prevail-
ing on these claims.' The Supreme Court has held that admission
of evidence at trial that is derived from unnecessarily suggestive
identification procedures may, depending upon the totality of the
circumstances surrounding those procedures, violate a defendant's
due process rights.'9 7 But, due to the small number of cases dealing
with suggestive eyewitness identification procedures in the § 1983
context, some confusion surrounds the issue of what exactly an ex-
oneree must establish to prevail on such a claim. 9s These claims
are important, though, because "mistaken eyewitness identifica-
tions have long been the leading cause of wrongful convictions."
The suggestive nature of the identification, alone, does not neces-
sarily mean a violation of due process rights. Instead, the Supreme
Court has stated that the reliability of the resulting identification
"is the linchpin" in determining the admissibility of the identifica-
210tion . In exoneration cases, though, this question of reliability
becomes moot because the exoneree has been determined to be
innocent. 2 0 Still, the question of causation remains: Did the sug-
gestive procedures really cause the misidentification? While
causation could be difficult to establish, one scholar has argued
that this will be rare, because the exoneree's attorney can easily
explain the harms of suggestive identification procedures, includ-
ing how they increase the risk of misidentification.202
Exonerees might also bring § 1983 claims rooted in allegations
of the fabrication of evidence. The prohibition on fabrication of
evidence is fundamental to our criminal justice system,203 and, as
196. Just like in the context of Brady violations, courts have failed to clarify whether a
claim based on a suggestive eyewitness identification procedure constitutes a violation of
procedural or substantive due process rights. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98,
113-14 (1977) (referring generically to "due process"); United States v. Pickar, 616 E3d 821,
827-28 (8th Cir. 2010) (same); Brisco v. Ercole, 565 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 2009) (same).
197. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 113-14; see also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1976),
overruled on other grounds by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
198. See Garrett, supra note 130, at 79-88 (noting that "few courts have dealt with civil
suggestion claims" and concluding that, "[o]f all the due process rights in the criminal con-
text, the law of suggestive identifications is the most confused").
199. Id. at 79.
200. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114. In Niel v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), the Court listed a
number of factors on which lower courts should base their reliability determinations. See id.
at 199-200. When this constitutional doctrine is translated into § 1983 terms, there is confu-
sion among the courts as to whether a defendant's due process rights are violated if the
identification evidence is not entered into evidence at trial. Garrett, supra note 130, at 79; see
Hernandez v. Terrones, 397 Fed. App'x. 954, 969 (2010).
201. See Garrett, supra note 130, at 85.
202. See id.
203. See Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2004).
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the Fifth Circuit has stated, it constitutes an "indisputab[le]" viola-
tion of a defendant's due process rights. 204 Fabrication of evidence
claims take the form of police officers altering evidence or lying
about its characteristics, officers testifying falsely, officers coercing
confessions, or even laboratory technicians using questionable sci-
205
entific standards or lying about the results of forensic tests.
Regardless of the form such a claim takes, there is disagreement
among courts about which constitutional provision provides the
basis for such a claim.20 6 Some courts have found such fabrication
to violate due process rights, although they have not all specified
whether those rights are procedural or substantive in nature.
Other courts have held that the claim of fabrication amounts to
one of malicious prosecution in violation of Fourth Amendment
rights. 208 In either form, fabrication of evidence could theoretically
be an excellent basis for a § 1983 claim; however, it is rare that a
claimant has convincing evidence of the deliberate framing of an
209innocent person through the use of manufactured evidence.
Still, one commentator has predicted that these claims may, in fu-
ture years, "be at the forefront of efforts to reform shoddy scientific
practices used by forensic crime labs responsible for many wrong-
ful convictions.,2
10
Those seeking to recover on behalf of an individual wrongfully
executed might have a broader due process claim unavailable to
those only wrongly convicted and incarcerated. In its 1993 case of
Herrera v. Collins,"' the Supreme Court faced the question of
whether a death row inmate was entitled to habeas corpus relief on
the ground of newly discovered evidence suggesting that the
inmate was possibly factually innocent. While the majority-
unconvinced of the individual's innocence-held that the death
row inmate was not entitled to habeas relief in the case, Justices
204. Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939,955 (5th Cir. 2003).
205. See Garrett, supra note 130, at 95-96.
206. See Avery, supra note 138, at 445.
207. See, e.g., Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 237 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating only that "the
deliberate or knowing creation of a misleading and scientifically inaccurate serology report
amounts to a violation of a defendant's due process rights").
208. See, e.g., Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 797-804 (10th Cir. 2008) (acknowledg-
ing that "Plaintiffs premised their § 1983 malicious prosecution claim on a violation of the
Fourth Amendment" and concluding that "the alleged facts establish[ed] the elements of
the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution").
209. See Avery, supra note 138, at 446. One scholar has stated, however, that "such grave
misconduct has occurred with surprising frequency, by one account in almost half of all
exonerations, and has led to a series of civil rights lawsuits that may provide a deterrent in
the future." Garrett, supra note 130, at 94.
210. Garrett, supra note 130, at 94.
211. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
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Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter dissented, asserting that the execu-
tion of an innocent person would violate substantive due process
rights.' They concluded that, just as the Court had held that the
conduct of police officers attempting to forcibly remove capsules
from a suspect's mouth and forcibly pumping his stomach violated
substantive due process guarantees, so too does executing an inno-
cent man.2 13 "Execution of an innocent person is the ultimate
'arbitrary imposition.' It is an imposition from which one never
recovers and for which one can never be compensated." 2 14
Not all judges agree that executing a factually innocent individ-
ual violates due process guarantees, however. While the Herrera
majority was not clear about whether there would be a due process
violation if the defendant had actually been innocent, the Nebras-
ka Supreme Court, surveying the constitutional landscape after
Herrera, concluded that, since that case was decided, "some ...
courts have held that deprivation of life or liberty, in the face of
persuasive evidence of the person's actual innocence, violates fun-
damental concepts of either procedural or substantive due process
of law." 15 And at least one commentator has argued that
"[s]ubstantive due process analysis is a particularly appropriate
prism through which to focus" when dealing with issues of wrong-
ful execution.1 Other lower courts have interpreted Herrera more
narrowly, though, to preclude such a due process claim.1 In People
v. Washington, for example, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded
that "Herrera clearly states . . . that a freestanding claim of inno-
cence is not cognizable as a fourteenth amendment [sic] due
process claim.",1
212. See id. at 435-36 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
213. See id. at 436-37.
214. Id. at 437 (citations omitted).
215. State v. Lotter, 771 N.W.2d 551, 564 (Neb. 2009) (citing In re Bell, 170 P.3d 153
(Cal. 2007) and People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330 (1ll. 1996)); see also, e.g., Ex Parte
Thompson, 153 S.W.3d 416, 417, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (granting habeas relief on a
stand-alone innocence claim like the one presented in Herrera). Even Justice Scalia has indi-
cated that there may be room for a claim of wrongful execution to be alleged under the Due
Process Clause. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 352 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In
Atkins, he stated that the concern of a special risk of wrongful execution-due to the de-
fendant's mental retardation, stupidity, or ugliness-could possibly be alleged in a due
process claim, but certainly not an Eighth Amendment claim. See id. Justice Scalia empha-
sized, though, that he doubted that such a claim has any substance. See id.
216. Ursula Bentele, Does the Death Penalty, by Risking Execution of the Innocent, Violate Sub-
stantive Due Process , 40 Hous. L. REv. 1359, 1366 (2004).
217. See, e.g., Robinson v. Johnson, 151 F.3d 256, 267 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the ac-
tual innocence dictum of Herrera); Dowthitt v. Johnson, 180 F. Supp. 2d 832, 842-43 (D.
Tex. 2000) (emphasizing the Herrera Court's statement that "a claim of 'actual innocence' is
not itself a constitutional claim").
218. Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1335.
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2. Other § 1983 Claims
Exonerees might also base their § 1983 claims on other constitu-
tional grounds.219  Some § 1983 claimants, for example, have
alleged Fourth Amendment violations by analogizing to the com-
mon law tort of malicious prosecution. 220 Lower courts disagree
about whether this is a cognizable claim, but most jurisdictions
have determined that a § 1983 plaintiff may prevail on such a claim
because the exoneree was unconstitutionally seized by being sub-
ject to criminal prosecution.2 2' To thus prevail, exonerees must
establish the common law elements of malicious prosecution: (1)
initiation of the criminal prosecution, (2) lack of probable cause,
(3) malicious purpose, and (4) termination of the proceedings in
the exoneree's favor.2 Just as in the context of common law torts,
though, the defendant can often easily negate liability by establish-
ing that he did not initiate the prosecution or that probable cause
existed.
Exonerees have also sought civil relief under § 1983 for ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, which is
not surprising considering that poor defense counsel has been
identified as a significant cause of wrongful conviction in nearly a
219. There may be a number of other bases for bringing § 1983 claims. For example,
some exonerees have also sought relief based upon claims of retaliatory prosecution. See
Avery, supra note 138, at 444-45. Due to space considerations, however, this Article will not
discuss every possible claim.
220. See, e.g., Gallo v. Philadelphia, 975 F. Supp. 723 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (reporting that the
plaintiff alleged a § 1983 claim rooted in the Fourth Amendment), rev'd, 161 F.3d 217 (3d
Cir. 1998) (concluding that "the combination of restrictions imposed upon Gallo, because
they intentionally limited his liberty, constituted a [Fourth Amendment] seizure"); see also
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (holding that an arrestee's § 1983 claim was rooted in
the Fourth Amendment).
221. See Avery, supra note 138, at 441. This uncertainty about whether the Fourth
Amendment applies to such a claim can be traced back to a 1994 Supreme Court decision in
which the Court held that a claimant may not recover on a § 1983 claim by alleging that the
Fifth Amendment is a guarantee against malicious prosecution. See Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266, 275 (1994). In this case, the Court failed to resolve whether the Fourth Amend-
ment would provide the basis for such a claim. See id. This is somewhat similar to a § 1983
false arrest or false imprisonment claim, but the Court has determined that these claims
cannot provide a remedy for wrongful conviction. See Avery, supra note 138, at 440. Section
1983 claims for false arrest and false imprisonment are premised on imprisonment without
legal process, and because an individual who has been wrongfully convicted has had some
legal process, his remedy for this wrong cannot lie in a § 1983 claim for false arrest or im-
prisonment. See id.
222. See Avery, supra note 138, at 441-42. Exoneration suffices for the element of termi-
nation of the proceedings in the exoneree's favor. See id. at 443.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 136-141.
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quarter of these cases.2 2 ' The Sixth Amendment guarantees a de-
fendant's right to the assistance of counsel in all criminal
prosecutions-a right that the Supreme Court has interpreted to
be a guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.22 ' As the Court
made clear in its seminal ineffective assistance case of Strickland v.
Washington,"" however, a conviction may be overturned only if
counsel was so deficient that it "undermined the proper function-
ing of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result."2 2 ' This prejudice requirement is dif-
ficult to establish, even considering that most public defenders'
offices are severely overburdened and the quality of representation
offered is often described as substandard.2 2 ' Despite this, some
claimants have had success on civil ineffective assistance claims,
usually when the public defender's office had a policy in place that
led to the ineffective assistance.22 ' For example, one exoneree was
able to sufficiently state a claim for relief pursuant to § 1983 when
he detailed that, as a result of a public defender's office's practice
of assigning its least experienced attorneys as defense counsel in
capital cases, he was wrongfully convicted.o
Finally, 1 § 1983 claimants might root their claims in the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.
Traditionally, § 1983 claims based on the Eighth Amendment have
focused on conditions of confinement.2 3 However, one could also
argue that it is unconstitutionally "cruel and unusual" to punish an
innocent person and, because the claimant was innocent, he
224. See Avery, supra note 138, at 451; Garrett, supra note 130, at 75 ("Poor lawyering
was a major cause in almost a quarter of the cases in which innocent people were exonerat-
ed by DNA.").
225. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (citing McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
226. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
227. See id. at 686.
228. See Garrett, supra note 130, at 77; Kenneth Williams, Why It Is So Difficult to Prove In-
nocence in Capital Cases, 42 TULSA L. REV. 241, 244 (2006) ("While some public defenders
perform admirably, many provide substandard representation to their clients.").
229. See Garrett, supra note 130, at 77-78.
230. See Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 467, 470-71 (2003); see also Garrett, su-
pra note 130, at 78. These cases in which defendants have established that there was a policy
that negatively affected the claimant are known as Monell claims. See, e.g., Heaney v.
Costigan, No. 09-cv-01006-MSK-BNB, 2011 WL 4368837, at *9 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2011);
Pimentel v. Fresno, No. 1:10-cv-01736-OWW-DLB, 2011 WL 4375046, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 19,2011).
231. See supra note 219 (noting that this Article does not discuss every possible § 1983
claim that could be asserted in relation to wrongful conviction).
232. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
233. See generally NAHMOD, supra note 185, § 3:28 (explaining that § 1983 is a claim fre-
quently alleged by prisoners challenging the conditions of their confinement).
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should be able to recover for a violation of his Eighth Amendment
right.234 As of the date of this Article, there appear to be no cases in
which a wrongfully convicted and incarcerated individual has pre-
vailed on such a claim." However, in Herrera,3 Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, and Souter indicated not only that executing an innocent
man might constitute a due process violation,3  but also that it
might violate the Eighth Amendment.238 While the majority em-
phasized that the inmate had failed to make a sufficient showing of
factual innocence,3  the dissenters blasted that "it plainly is viola-
tive of the Eighth Amendment to execute a person who is actually
innocent.,,240 "Nothing could be more contrary to contemporary
standards of decency, or more shocking to the conscience ... ."
It "epitomizes 'the purposeless and needless imposition of pain
and suffering,"24 2 and it is "contrary to any standard of decency."243
In the more recent Eighth Amendment case of Atkins v. Virginia,24
six majority justices-Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer-emphasized their fear of wrongful execu-
tion in reaching the conclusion that executing "mentally retarded"
individuals constitutes unconstitutionally cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.24 5
3. Immunities, Survival Suits, and Wrongful Death Claims
In addition to the difficulties of establishing a prima facie § 1983
claim, exonerees have had to wrestle with the same additional hur-
dles that common law tort plaintiffs have faced. Section 1983
defendants may be insulated from liability under various doctrines
of immunity. States cannot be held liable for damages under
241§ 1983, nor can state officials be sued in their official capacities.
234. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIll.
235. But cf Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 606-07 (10th Cir. 2011) (listing courts that
have had serious concerns that punishing an innocent individual could constitute cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
236. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 212-214.
238. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 430-35 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
239. See id. at 417-19.
240. Id. at 431 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 430 (citation omitted).
242. Id. at 431-32 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
243. Id. at 435.
244. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
245. See id. at 321.
246. See Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989); NAHMOD, supra note
185, § 6:67.
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Further, similar doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity apply
to defendants such as judges, prosecutors, and police officers.
Aside from immunity issues, claimants hoping to recover for
wrongful execution most likely must pursue their § 1983 claims
through state survival and wrongful death suits.2 " As in the com-
mon law torts context, this leaves claimants with meager
opportunities to prevail for wrongful execution under § 1983.
C. Statutory Remedies
Presumably in light of these difficulties that exonerees face in
bringing claims under the common law and § 1983,250 in 1913 some
states began promulgating statutes to provide compensation for
those wrongfully convicted and incarcerated. 25' Today, twenty-seven
states, plus the District of Columbia and the federal government,
statutorily provide compensation for wrongful conviction and in-
carceration.0  These statutes vary in form, but, as a prerequisite for
compensation, they ordinarily require that the claimant be con-
victed of a criminal offense, that he actually served time in prison,
and that he is factually innocent of the crime charged." In
Willingham's home state of Texas, for example, an individual is
entitled to compensation if he was imprisoned and either received
247. See supra text accompanying notes 159-164; NAHMOD, supra note 185, § 7:1. Fur-
ther, in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), the Supreme Court concluded that a
public defender cannot be held liable under § 1983 because "a public defender does not act
under color of state law when performing the traditional functions of counsel to a criminal
defendant." Id. at 317 n.4.
248. See NAHMOD, supra note 185, § 4:64; cf supra text accompanying notes 165-178
(explaining wrongful death and survival suits in the context of common law torts).
249. See supra Part III.A.
250. Although there is no legislative history for the first compensation bill passed in the
United States, the first compensation statutes were likely passed in response to a number of
high-profile exonerations. See Shelley Fite, Comment, Compensation for the Unjustly Imprisoned:
A Modelfor Reform in Wisconsin, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 1181, 1194, 1211 (2005).
251. See Anders Bratholm, Compensation of Persons Wrongfully Accused or Convicted in Nor-
way, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 833, 845-46 (1961). The first American compensations statutes were
promulgated in California and Wisconsin in 1913. See id. North Dakota followed suit four
years later in 1917. See id. And in 1938, the federal government enacted its own compensa-
tion statute for wrongful conviction. See id. at 846.
252. See 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (2006); Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Construction and Ap-
plication of State Statutes Providing Compensation for Wrongful Conviction and Incarceration, 53
A.L.R. 6TH 305, § 2 (2010); Reforms by State, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/news/LawViewl.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). For a list of
such compensation schemes, see the Appendix.
253. See Buckman, supra note 252, § 2. Compensation statutes often require the claim-
ant to establish factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at
Introduction & § 7.
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a full pardon or was granted other relief based on his actual inno-
cence.25 4 Some statutes require additional elements for a successful
compensation claim, such as proof that the claimant suffered a pe-
cuniary injury or that he did not contribute to his own conviction
by, for example, providing a non-coerced confession or concealing
another's guilt.2 55
While those who were wrongfully convicted and incarcerated are
more likely to obtain compensation through these statutory reme-
dies, a significant number of exonerees bringing claims under
these statutes remain uncompensated. As one scholar has estimat-
ed, only about forty-one percent of exonerees have received any
256
such statutory compensation. * Moreover, even when exonerees
prevail on their claims and are compensated, that compensation is
often glaringly inadequate? A number of these compensation
statutes assess damages based on the number of years that the
claimant was wrongfully imprisoned. For example, in Texas, the
wrongfully convicted and incarcerated individual is entitled to
"$80,000 multiplied by the number of years served in prison. 25
The claimant may also receive certain tuition benefits in addition
to this compensation.2"9 The less generous Louisiana statute sets
the claimant's compensation at $25,000 per year incarcerated, not
to exceed a maximum total amount of $250,000.260 The Louisiana
statute also provides additional funds for tuition,job skills training,
and the like. Other statutes provide the states' courts with
254. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001 (West 2009). The individual is
not entitled to compensation, though, if he was serving a concurrent sentence for a differ-
ent crime and he was not also innocent of that crime. See id.; see also Appendix (outlining
Texas's compensation statute).
255. See Buckman, supra note 252, § 2.
256. See Brandon L. Garrett,judgingInnocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 120 (2008).
257. See Adam Kaplan, Comment, The Case for Comparative Fault in Compensating the
Wrongfully Convicted, 56 UCLA L. REv. 227, 234-35 (2008); infra note 283 and accompanying
text; see also Appendix (listing the compensation available under each state's compensation
statute).
258. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052 (West 2009). The claimant's entitled
recovery also includes "compensation for child support payments owed by the person on
whose imprisonment the claim is based that became due and interest on child support ar-
rearages that accrued during the time served in prison but were not paid." Id. A claimant
who was released on parole or required to register as a sex offender after release is entitled
to additional compensation, based on the number of years he was obligated to live under
these conditions. See id.
259. See TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.054 (West 2009) (providing for "tui-
tion for up to 120 credit hours," so long as this benefit is "requested ... before the seventh
anniversary of the date the claimant received the pardon or was granted relief'); see also
Appendix (outlining Texas's compensation statute).
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discretion to determine the most appropriate amount of damages
in these cases. The relevant New York statute, for example, pro-
vides that, "[i] f the court finds that the claimant is entitled to a
judgment, it shall award damages in such sum of money as the
court determines will fairly and reasonably compensate him."
Courts provided such discretion have based their damages deter-
minations primarily on the exoneree's lost wages while he was
incarcerated.2 6 3 Some courts have also awarded non-pecuniary
damages to exonerees.6  In Baba-Ali v. State,' for example, the
New York Court of Claims focused on the exoneree's "loss of repu-
tation, mental anguish and, above all, [his] loss of liberty."6
Accounting for each of these factors, the court ultimately deter-
mined that, in addition to his lost wages, the exoneree was entitled
to $1.75 million in non-pecuniary damages.
These statutes providing exonerees with some compensation for
their wrongful convictions and incarcerations, however inade-
quate, have been justified on a number of grounds. Compensating
victims of wrongful conviction and incarceration can be premised
on the government's failure to uphold its end of the bargain that it
will provide protection from other individuals' criminal conduct
and the risk of wrongful conviction in exchange for each member
of society submitting to the criminal law.26' Additionally, the gov-
262. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-B(6) (2011); see also Appendix (outlining New York's com-
pensation statute).
263. See Buckman, supra note 252, § 30.
264. See id.
265. 878 N.Y.S.2d 555 (Ct. Cl. 2009), rev'd in part, 907 N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Div. 2010).
266. Id. at 560.
267. Id. at 570. The court classified the exoneree's loss of reputation as great and em-
phasized that he was convicted of raping his own daughter--one of the most loathsome
offenses in modern society. See id. at 561. Turning to the exoneree's mental anguish, the
court acknowledged that the exoneree's wrongful conviction 'just destroyed him" and that
this anguish was exacerbated by his forced separation from his family and society. Id. at 560.
Moreover, the exoneree tragically lost his close relationship with his daughter. See id. at 560-
63. The court stated that the exoneree was subjected to "the miseries of prison life" and that
these miseries were magnified by the fact that other prisoners generally targeted child rap-
ists. See id. at 560-61 (quoting Campbell v. State, 62 N.YS.2d 638, 642 (Ct. Cl. 1946)).
"[C]onfinement was doubly hard," the court explained, "because he was innocent." Id. at
561 (quoting Campbell, 62 N.YS.2d at 642-43). Finally, the court concluded that "imprison-
ment resulting from the unjust conviction of an innocent person is 'the most serious
deprivation of individual liberty that a society may impose."' Id. at 564 (quoting REP. OF THE
N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N TO THE GOVERNOR ON REDRESS FOR INNOCENT PERSONS UN-
JUSTLY CONVICTED AND SUBSEQUENTLY IMPRISONED, McKinney's 1984 Sess. Laws of N.Y.
2899, 2903). "Liberty is absolute and the loss of it irreplaceable." Id. at 564 (quoting
McLaughlin v. State, 89 N.Y.L.J. 25 (Ct. Cl. 1989)). Taking all of these factors into account,
the court awarded the exoneree non-pecuniary damages in the amount of $1.75 million. See
id. at 570. This amount was reduced to $1 million on appeal. See Baba-Ali v. State, 907
N.Y.S.2d 432, 432 (App. Div. 2010).
268. See Kaplan, supra note 257, at 243.
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ernment can bear the costs of wrongful convictions more easily
than exonerees and can spread those costs across the rest of socie-
ty269 Bearing these costs allows the government to strike the
appropriate balance between pursuing suspected criminal offend-
ers and protecting criminal defendants. 70  Further, taking
responsibility for wrongful convictions may inspire greater faith in
the criminal justice system, thus dressing it in greater legitimacy,
which could, in turn, inspire greater compliance with the law.
Perhaps most importantly, though, these compensation statutes
may cause state agents to be more vigilant in ensuring reliable con-
victions and appropriate sentences so as to avoid unjust outcomes
in the criminal justice system.2" As one commentator put it, these
"compensation statutes shift the costs of erroneous conviction from
the wrongfully convicted individuals to the state forcing the gov-
ernment to internalize a substantial negative externality. Once
these costs are internalized, the state will be motivated to take the
proper level of care in order to prevent wrongful convictions."2 1
However, there remain concerns that compensating individuals
for wrongful convictions and incarcerations will impose significant
costs on states and will negatively affect their criminal justice sys-
tems by, for example, causing police officers and prosecutors to be
269. See Edwin Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminaljustice, 21 B.U. L. REV. 201,
208 (1941) (comparing such compensation to the workers' compensation system, in which
"society distributes the loss among its members"); Keith S. Rosenn, Compensating the Innocent
Accused, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 705, 716 (1976) (explaining that, "[a]s between the accused and
the state, it is more just to place the loss caused by the inevitable errors of the criminal jus-
tice system on the state" and that "the state is the ideal agency to spread the risk of loss over
the entire society"); Kaplan, supra note 257, at 242; Note, Postrelease Remedies for Wrongful
Conviction, 74 HAv. L. REv. 1615, 1627 (1961) ("The state .. . is better able to bear the loss
than the injured party. . . .").
270. See Kaplan, supra note 257, at 243.
271. See id. at 241-42 (noting that "governments do care about the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system"); Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution (S. Methodist Univ. Dedman
Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 67, 2011), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1751 7 84 (explaining that when the criminal
justice system is viewed as illegitimate, "it can ... lead to individuals' failures to comply with
the law").
272. See Rosenn, supra note 269, at 716 (suggesting that providing compensation for
wrongfully accused individuals could "discourage police and prosecutors from bringing
groundless prosecutions, or at least induce greater circumspection in invoking the machin-
ery of the criminal justice system"). Aside from these justifications for compensation,
Professor Rosenn explains that this compensation could be accomplished either through a
fault-based tort regime, an eminent domain structure, or strict liability. See id. at 715-17.
273. Kaplan, supra note 257, at 241. Some have argued, though, that "governments do
not internalize costs like private firms, so imposing liability for wrongful conviction may not
result in the reforms desired." Id.; see also Rosenthal, supra note 135, at 129-31 (arguing that
"[t]he likelihood of the government undertaking efforts to reduce its exposure to liability is
particularly remote" and that, if the government were to take measures to reduce the risk of
wrongful conviction, the costs of these efforts could far exceed the benefits).
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less diligent in pursuing criminal conduct, causing juries to be
more hesitant in concluding that an individual has been wrongfully
convicted and prosecuted, or swamping already over-burdened sys-
tems with additional claims.7 Further, some commentators argue
that individuals have essentially assumed the risk of being
wrongfully convicted by benefiting from the societal safety that the
criminal justice system provides.27' Still, most commentators have
determined that the benefits of statutory compensation outweigh
these indefinite costs.26
Aside from the states that statutorily provide for compensating
victims of wrongful conviction and incarceration, some states have
allowed exonerees to push moral obligation laws through the state
legislature.7 These laws are drafted and passed to address specific
instances in which an individual or entity is entitled to state com-
pensation.2 7" They honor "an obligation which, though lacking any
foundation cognizable in law, springs from a sense of justice and
equity, that an honorable person would entertain, but not from a
mere sense of doing benevolence or charity. 27 11 While some ex-
onerees have successfully navigated this difficult course to recover
pursuant to moral obligation laws, obtaining compensation for
wrongful conviction and incarceration in this manner is unpre-
dictable.2 o Some states, such as Texas and Oregon, constitutionally
prohibit the enactment of moral obligation laws." Further, obtain-
274. See Kaplan, supra note 257, at 236-38.
275. See id. at 238-39. These commentators also suggest that the individual-rather
than the government itself-is often to blame for the individual's wrongful conviction and
incarceration. See id. at 240 (stating that one of the objections to statutory compensation
"stems from the notion that many wrongfully convicted individuals are themselves to blame,
and should not be rewarded").
276. See Rosenthal, supra note 135, at 127.
277. See Bernhard, When justice Fails, supra note 130, at 94-95 (describing how Edward
Honaker-a man wrongfully convicted and incarcerated-was compensated in the amount
of $500,000 through a moral obligation bill passed by the Virginia legislature).
278. See id. at 93.
279. Id. (quoting Koike v. Bd. of Water Supply, 352 P.2d 835, 839 (Haw. 1960)).
280. See Bernhard, When justice Fails, supra note 130, at 94-97.
281. See, e.g., OR. CONST. art. IV, § 24 ("Provision may be made by general law, for
bringing suit against the State, as to all liabilities originating after, or existing at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution; but no special act authorizeing [sic] such suit to be
brought, or making compensation to any person claiming damages against the State, shall
ever be passed."); Rector v. State, 495 P.2d 826, 826-27 (Okla. 1972) (holding unconstitu-
tional the state legislature's resolution waiving the state's immunity for a particular plaintiff's
claim because it violated the state constitutional prohibition that, "where a general law can
be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted"); Adams v. Harris Cnty., 530 S.W.2d
606, 608 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (concluding that the Texas legislature lacked power to "waive
its immunity from liability by means of special legislation for the benefit of a particular par-
ty, thus denying all citizens the equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the Texas
Constitution"); see also Bernhard, When justice Fails, supra note 130, at 94.
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ing relief through these individualized bills can be considerably
time-consuming, and, perhaps more importantly, achieving success
2812by this method often depends on political connections _
something often far beyond the reach of those wrongfully
convicted.
IV. THE NEED FOR COMPENSATORY STATUTORY PROVISIONS
DIRECTED SPECIFICALLY AT WRONGFUL EXECUTION
Although exonerees have been much more successful in finding
monetary relief through compensation statutes than through
common law tort or civil rights claims, commentators have insisted
that these compensation statutes do not provide sufficient com-
pensation for exonerees.m For example, Missouri limits an
exoneree's award to approximately $18,000 per year incarcerated,
and Montana provides relief only in the form of educational aid.m
Considering the ordeals suffered by wrongfully convicted individu-
als, these amounts are entirely inadequate. After all, the criminal
justice system has failed these exonerees by unjustly convicting and
incarcerating them, and these innocent persons have lost at least
two things that are priceless: time and liberty.
The statutes are also inadequate in that they address only the
situations of those who have been wrongfully convicted and incar-
cerated; they do not explicitly account for individuals who have
been wrongfully executed. Some states do provide for the survival
of claims under their statutory compensation schemes, allowing an
exoneree's compensation to be passed on to his heirs after the ex-
oneree's demise. In Texas, for example, the compensation statute
provides that, "[i]f a deceased person would be entitled to com-
pensation under [the statute] if living, including a person who
282. SeeBerhard, When justice Fails, supra note 129, at 94-96.
283. See Rosenthal, supra note 135, at 127 ("[I]n recent years, there has been wide-
spread support for expanding the damages remedies available to those who have been
wrongfully accused or convicted. Indeed, in the academy, there has hardly been a dissenting
voice on the subject."); see also, e.g., Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a Denim jacket? A Model Statute
for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REv. 665, 703 (2002) (asserting that "the
most glaring flaw in many of the statutory schemes" is the limit on monetary compensation,
which essentially "mandates that a wrongly convicted person [will] be undercompensated
for his injuries"); John Martinez, Wrongful Convictions as Rightful Takings: Protecting "Liberty-
Property'" 59 HASTINGs L.J. 515, 533 (2008) (explaining that most scholars have criticized
these compensation schemes for imposing "so many procedural and substantive hurdles to
recovery that most wrongfully convicted people are denied compensation").
284. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 650.058(1) (2010) ("The individual may receive an amount of
fifty dollars per day for each day of post-conviction incarceration for the crime for which the
individual is determined to be actually innocent."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (2010).
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received a posthumous pardon, the person's heirs, legal represent-
atives, and estate are entitled to lump-sum compensation [in equal
amount].",2" A wrongfully executed individual's heirs could thus
argue that they are entitled to some compensation for the wrong
perpetrated against the decedent.
However, any compensation to which a wrongfully executed in-
dividual's heirs would be entitled would not truly compensate for
the injustice of wrongful execution. The individual's heirs would
instead be receiving compensation for only a collateral conse-
quence of being sentenced to death under a system in which
additional procedural protections are required when a capital sen-
tence is at issue (likely a system more appreciated by a death row
defendant than one in which such additional protections were not
available). As a result of these procedural protections erected after
the Court struck down the death penalty in Furman," death row
inmates ordinarily spend a significant amount of time incarcerated
before they are executed. Indeed, the average amount of time the-
se inmates spend on death row before being executed is about
thirteen years."8 At least in jurisdictions that premise statutory re-
lief on the number of years wrongfully incarcerated," then, the
heirs of individuals wrongfully executed would likely be entitled to
some of the larger available monetary awards. Still, this compensa-
tion would not reflect the harm of the wrongful execution itself.
Further, it is far from clear that the heirs of wrongfully executed
individuals would be able to recover even the inadequate compen-
sation provided under statutory schemes allowing the survival of
claims. One could argue-although perhaps not convincingly-
that, because these individuals were not sentenced to any specific
term of imprisonment," neither they nor their heirs should be
able to collect under these statutes that premise recovery on an
285. TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(c) (West 2009).
286. 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see supra text accompanying note 85.
287. See Margaret Vandiver & David J. Giacopassi, Geriatric Executions: Growing Old and
Dying on Death Row, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. No. 3 (2010).
288. See id.
289. For example, under Texas Law, a defendant's sentence is the "part of the judgment
... that orders that the punishment be carried into execution," TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. Art. 42.02 (2010), and, in Willingham's case, the sentence that the judge imposed was
"[d]eath," not death and the more-than-a-decade-long stay on death row that preceded it.
Judgment on Jury Verdict of Guilty, State v. Willingham, No. 24,467 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21,
1992). Even though Willingham's sentence was death alone, Texas law does provide that a
defendant sentenced to death "shall be delivered to a jail or to the Texas Department of




innocent individual serving a sentence of imprisonment.290 One
could also argue that, unlike individuals who were wrongfully con-
victed and incarcerated but not executed, individuals who have
been put to death do not need financial assistance to transition
back into society after incarceration and therefore should not be
compensated at all. If courts find these arguments persuasive, a
wrongfully executed individual's heirs could find themselves en-
tirely without any statutory relief despite a jurisdiction's general
provision for the survival of wrongful conviction claims.
Even if the heirs of wrongfully executed individuals are able to
prevail under compensation statutes providing for the survival of
claims, any such remuneration would fail to fully compensate the
heirs because the current statutes do not acknowledge that death is
a more significant harm than even life imprisonment.'9 The law
routinely categorizes execution as the most severe punishment
available. As the Supreme Court has explained, "death is differ-
ent."9 2 It is different by virtue of "its extreme severity. Death is ...
an unusually severe punishment, unusual in its pain, in its finality,
and in its enormity.""' It is also unusual in the infrequency with
which it is imposed."' Capital punishment's status as the most se-
vere penalty available under American law has led the Supreme
Court to rule that the punishment must be reserved for the worst
29
offenders. In Roper v. Simmons, for example, the Court stated that
"[c]apital punishment must be limited to those offenders who
commit 'a narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose
extreme culpability makes them 'the most deserving of execu-
tion.' 2 9 6 It has also led the Court to require greater procedural
safeguards in capital cases than in other sentencing cases. Yet
290. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2010) (providing that an exoneree is enti-
tied to compensation "if he has served in whole or in part a sentence of imprisonment");
TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001 (West 2009) (stating that an innocent individ-
ual is entitled to compensation if he "served in whole or in part a sentence in prison").
291. Interestingly, not all cultures agree that the punishment of death is worse than life
imprisonment. See Shahram Dana, Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice: A Theory on the Prin-
ciple of Legality in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 857,
893 (2009) ("Many states, Yugoslavia included, hold the view that life imprisonment is cruel-
er and more severe than capital punishment.").
292. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986). But see Meghan J. Ryan, judging
Cruelty, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 81, 113 (2010) (noting that the Court's recent decision in
Graham v. Rlorida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), may indicate that the Court's long-standing "death
is different" principle no longer holds).
293. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287 (1972) (Brennan,J., concurring).
294. See id. at 291.
295. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
296. Id. at 568 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
297. See Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REv. 283,
370-71 (2008); Carol S. Steiker &Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
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statutes attempting to compensate offenders who have suffered
wrongful conviction and punishment leave wholly unaddressed this
prevalent view that death is the worst available punishment.
Aside from the fact that all such compensation statutes fail to
provide for this greater harm of execution, many of these statutes
do not even allow a decedent's right of compensation to survive his
death. Nebraska's compensation statute, for example, provides that
"[a] claimant's cause of action under the act shall not be assignable
and shall not survive the claimant's death.""" Similarly, Missouri's
compensation statute provides that " [n] o claim or petition for res-
titution under this section may be filed by the individual's heirs or
assigns" and that "[tihe state's obligation to pay restitution under
this section shall cease upon the individual's death."299 This means
that not only will wrongfully executed individuals not be entitled to
greater relief due to this greater wrong, but their heirs likely will
not be entitled to any relief whatsoever under these statutes.
Statutory compensation schemes, which are aimed at compen-
sating innocent individuals for the terrible wrongs the government
has perpetrated against them, should provide for the compensa-
tion of those wrongfully executed by reflecting the fact that
individuals wrongfully executed suffer, at a minimum, the same
injustice as those wrongfully convicted and incarcerated. In fact,
these compensation schemes should reflect the death penalty's
continuous characterization as a more severe punishment than in-
carceration3 0 by providing even greater compensation for those
wrongfully executed than the mostly inadequate amounts provided
to individuals wrongfully convicted and incarcerated. Certainly,
individuals wrongfully executed will not benefit from statutory re-
lief in the same way that those wrongfully convicted and
incarcerated will; statutory relief provides monetary and other as-
sistance to wrongfully convicted and incarcerated individuals that
can help them transition back into society after a period of time
behind bars,"0 whereas wrongfully executed individuals clearly
have no need for this financial assistance for reintegration. But
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REv. 355, 370-71
(1995).
298. NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-4604(5) (2009).
299. Mo. REv. STAT. § 650.058(3) (2010).
300. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (stating that "the death pen-
alty is the most severe punishment").
301. Cf Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45
B.C. L. REv. 255, 259 (2004). Not only do innocent individuals benefit from such assistance,
but criminal offenders who have served their time in prison also benefit from monetary and
other assistance to help them reintegrate into society. See id. ("The ex-offender population
has tended to recidivate due in part to an unavailability of economic and social supports.").
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that does not mean that the families and friends of those wrongful-
ly executed have no need for financial assistance, as they may have
lost significant financial support as a result of the wrongful convic-
tion and execution. Further, while statutory relief is not necessary
to clear the name of a deceased loved one-something undoubted-
ly valuable to the friends and families of those wrongfully
convicted5o2-simply clearing the name of an individual who has
been wrongfully executed is not enough. Aptly named, these stat-
utes are intended to compensate an individual for a wrong
perpetrated by the government.303 This goal does not become obso-
lete once an individual has been wrongfully executed; indeed, it
becomes of greater concern because an even more grievous injus-
tice has been committed. These individuals have not only been
unjustly convicted and incarcerated, but they have also been sen-
tenced to death. And they have lost even more: They have lost
their lives. This greater loss calls for greater compensation-even
beyond that to which today's wrongfully convicted and incarcer-
ated individuals may be entitled.
Amending compensation statutes to account for wrongful exe-
cutions would not only acknowledge the more severe injustice
imposed on those wrongfully executed than on those wrongfully
convicted and incarcerated, but it might also cause individual ac-
tors to take their death decisions more seriously. Again, states, and
even some scholars, are concerned that compensation statutes
benefitting individuals wrongfully convicted and incarcerated
could lead to high costs that states simply cannot afford.04 Other
302. See, e.g., Elliott Blackburn, Church Asked Forgiveness by Convicted Rapist, LUBBOCK
AVALANCHE-JOURNAL, May 22, 2011, available at http://lubbockonline.com/local-
news/2011-05-21/church-asked-forgiveness-convicted-rapist (explaining that Timothy
"Cole's family was overjoyed" when someone else confessed to committing the crime for
which Cole was convicted and later exonerated).
303. See Borchard, supra note 269, at 207 (quoting Wigmore); see also United States v.
Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 974, at 31, 63rd Cong.
(3d Sess. 1914)) (stating that, according to the relevant legislative history, the original fed-
eral compensation statute was designed to compensate an innocent individual for the
"pecuniary injury he . . . sustained through his erroneous conviction and imprisonment");
William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REv. 329, 385 n.266 (1995) (noting
that "[i]nnocence compensation statutes are designed to provide citizens a remedy from the
state or government for loss of liberty due to wrongful prosecution and/or wrongful impris-
onment").
304. See Bernhard, justice Still Fails, supra note 130, at 713 (citing Interview with Ann
Lambert, Legislative Counsel, ACLU of Mass. (Jan. 2004); Interview with Sharon Bivens,
Alabama Legislative Fiscal Office Aug. & Sept. 2000) (explaining that one of the major
grounds for opposing compensation statutes is the concern "that the statutes will be increas-
ingly expensive as an ever larger number of exonerees petition for awards"); Bernhard,
When justice Fails, supra note 130, at 106 ("States may have limited awards out of fear that the
sheer number of claims would strain state budgets."); cf Borchard, supra note 269, at 209
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scholars have responded that this concern is unwarranted,0 ' that
states can better bear these costs than exonerees anyway,o6 and that
imposing these costs on the government will motivate the govern-
ment to take greater care in ensuring the reliability of
convictions.07 It would certainly be beneficial, especially in the
context of capital punishment, to motivate the government to im-
prove the reliability of convictions. Before resorting to the extreme
punishment of execution, the government should be so certain
about the propriety of its death decisions that the potentially ex-
treme costs resulting from wrongful execution should be of little
concern. Placing the state on the hook for this terrible injustice of
wrongful execution might make the state and its actors take the
punishment of death more seriously.o
Although widespread DNA exonerations have raised questions
about the soundness of our criminal justice system, some govern-
mental actors do not take these questions of wrongful convictions,
or even wrongful executions, seriously enough. There are a num-
ber of cases in which evidence surfaced prior to an individual's ex-
(attempting to ameliorate concerns about burdens that compensation statutes could put on
the "State treasury"); Edwin M. Borchard, European Systems of State Indemnity for Errors of Crim-
inal justice, 3 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 684, 694, 697 (1912) (noting that
European states were initially reluctant to enact compensation statutes due to "the unwill-
ingness to open already cramped treasuries to unlimited inroads and the inability of lower
and upper houses of legislatures to agree upon the proper limitations of the right" and
explaining that, once enacted, the compensation statutes limited indemnity "so that the
burden on the State Treasury will not be oppressive"); Rosenn, supra note 269, at 725 (com-
paring "[t]he objection ... that the costs of permitting recovery from the state for
erroneous accusations will be astronomical" to the objection that indemnifying those wrong-
fully convicted and incarcerated will place too great of a burden on state treasuries); supra
text accompanying note 274.
305. Bernhard, justice Still Fails, supra note 130, at 713-16 (explaining how the increas-
ing cost concern is unfounded); Bernhard, When justice Fails, supra note 130, at 106 (arguing
that the concern that compensation will too severely strain state budgets "is unfounded").
306. See Borchard, supra note 269, at 208 (explaining that one of the theories underly-
ing compensation for wrongfully convicted individuals is akin to the workers' compensation
system and that "society distributes the loss among its members" in this circumstance be-
cause it would be unfair for the injured individuals to bear their losses individually);
Postrelease Remedies for Wrongful Conviction, supra note 269, at 1627 (asserting that " [t]he state
... is better able to bear the loss than the injured party"); Rosenn, supra note 269, at 716
("[T]he state is the ideal agency to spread the risk of loss over the entire society."); supra
text accompanying note 269.
307. See Rosenn, supra note 269, at 716 (explaining that providing compensation for
wrongful accusation could have the collateral benefit of "discourag[ing] police and prosecu-
tors from bringing groundless prosecutions, or at least induc[ing] greater circumspection in
invoking the machinery of the criminal justice system"); supra text accompanying notes 272-
273.
308. Recall, though, that not all scholars agree that enacting compensation statutes for
wrongful conviction and incarceration will successfully motivate government officials to act
any differently. See supra note 273.
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execution that strongly suggested that the individual about to be
executed might be innocent. 3 Cameron Todd Willingham was one
of those individuals."o Just before Willingham was strapped to a
chair and injected with the lethal cocktail of sodium pentothal,
pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride,3 1' Texas's Gover-
nor Perry was provided with information that the primary evidence
against Willingham-the expert testimony that the fire that had
killed his children resulted from arson-was very possibly based on
faulty science. Yet Governor Perry neglected to halt or stay the
execution until the matter could be further investigated.3 13
Unfortunately, Governor Perry's actions are not exceptional
among governors and others who have the authority to prevent or
delay executions in which evidence of guilt is, or has become, ques-
tionable.1 Yet courts routinely refer to governors' clemency
powers as the principal, if not the only, safeguard in our criminal
justice system."' Courts rely on this backstop in denying convicted
309. See, e.g.,Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512, 522, 524-25 (Fla. 1998) (explaining that pri-
or to Leo Jones's execution, a key witness who had testified against Jones recanted and
twelve other individuals said that they had seen a different man running with a rifle away
from the crime scene or that they had heard that other man confess to the crime); Ed Pilk-
ington, Troy Davis Campaigners Vow to Fight 'Inhumane and Inflexible' Death Penalty, THE
GUARDIAN, Sept. 22, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/22/
troy-davis-execution-death-penalty (explaining that prior to Troy Davis's execution, evidence
arose that seven key witnesses who had testified against Davis had recanted and that other
witnesses had testified that another man was guilty of the murder for which Davis was con-
victed and sentenced to death).
310. See supra Part I.
311. Cf Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled
the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 97 n.322 (2007) (noting that, as reported in 2005,
Texas's lethal cocktail contained "1.30 ml of solution containing 3 g of Thiopental Sodium
(Sodium Pentothal); 2.50 ml of solution containing 100 mg of Pancuronium Bromide; 3.70
ml of solution containing 140 mEq of Potassium Chloride").
312. See MATERIAL FROM GOVERNOR PERRY'S OFFICE AND BOARD OF PARDONS AND PA-
ROLES, supra note 51, at 2.
313. See Steve Barnes, National Briefing South: Man Executed for Fatal Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 2004, at A16 (reporting that Willingham was executed in 2004); supra text accompanying
notes 34 & 53. Again, Governor Perry's power to grant a reprieve is limited by the Texas
Constitution. See supra notes 34 & 53.
314. See, e.g., Bill Rankin, Mistaken Identity, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Oct. 2,
2011, at IB (explaining that the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles declined to grant
clemency to Troy Davis prior to his execution despite the fact that evidence had surfaced
that cast doubt on Davis's guilt); Jackie Hallifax, Lawyer Claims Medina Suffered, AsksJustices to
Stop Next Execution, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 4, 1997, at lB (reporting that, prior to Leo Jones's
execution, one of the jurors in Jones's trial wrote to the Governor to ask that he grant clem-
ency to Jones in light of the fact that someone else had confessed to the crime and one of
the witnesses againstJones had recanted his testimony).
315. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411-15 (1993) ("Executive clemency has
provided the 'fail safe' in our criminal justice system," and "history is replete with examples
of wrongfully convicted persons who have been pardoned in the wake of after-discovered
evidence establishing their innocence.").
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individuals relief when, for example, exculpatory evidence has
come to light.3 16 So long as the individual received a fair trial,
courts have opined, the truth of the conviction is not a priority,
because relief for what turned out to be an erroneous result at a
fair trial should be left to the aegis that state governors provide "
As the Supreme Court has stated, executive clemency "is the histor-
ic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial
process has been exhausted,"" and it is "the 'fail safe' . . . in our
criminal justice system."1 9 Still, several Supreme Court Justices
have intimated that the execution of a factually innocent individual
is concerning and perhaps even rises to the level of a constitutional
3201
violation. Such an egregious wrong should not only be recog-
nized by the current system but also mitigated by providing these
victims, or their heirs, with some form of compensation.
CONCLUSION
The Willingham case is just one instance in which governmental
actors have turned a blind eye to evidence suggesting that a con-
victed individual might be innocent. Regardless of why such
evidence is ignored-whether because of a belief that trials always
produce reliable results, a theory that criminal defendants are enti-
tled to only procedural fairness but not necessarily the truth, or
incredulousness that any convicted individual could actually be
innocent-the overwhelming number of recent DNA exonerations
suggests that numerous criminal convictions, and even death sen-
tences, could have been unjustly imposed. While individuals
wrongfully convicted and incarcerated face any number of difficul-
316. See id. at 415; see also, e.g., Brown v. State, 955 S.W.2d 901 (Ark. 1997) (denying a
defendant's petition to reinvest the trial court with jurisdiction to consider a petition for a
writ of coram nobis, because the claim was not timely, and the defendant's
assertion that another party had confessed to the crime after the judgment was affirmed
"may be addressed to the executive branch in a clemency proceeding").
317. See, e.g., Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400 ("This rule is grounded in the principle that fed-
eral habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the
Constitution-not to correct errors of fact."); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923)
("[W]hat we have to deal with is not the petitioners' innocence or guilt but solely the ques-
tion whether their constitutional rights have been preserved."); Royal v. Taylor, 188 F.3d
239, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (suggesting that "state clemency proceedings provide the proper
forum to pursue claims of actual innocence based on new facts"); Hauck v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d
812, 813 (3d Cir. 1944) ("As to the last ground asserted by the appellant, if he can demon-
strate his innocence, his application should be to the President of the United States for
executive clemency.").
318. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 412.
319. Id. at 415.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 212-214.
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ties in seeking compensation for the governmental wrongs perpe-
trated against them, wrongfully executed individuals and their
heirs, families, and friends are likely left with no compensation
whatsoever. The compensation statutes that currently exist in twen-
ty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system
should be revisited with the interests of wrongfully executed indi-
viduals, and their beneficiaries, in mind. To compensate this
forgotten group, not only should these individuals be explicitly ac-
counted for in these statutes, but the statutes should also reflect
that, according to Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence,
these individuals have each suffered an even greater wrong than
those individuals who have been wrongfully convicted and incar-
certed.
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APPENDIX
Jurisdiction Compensation Provision Compensation Scheme
Alabama Ala. Code. § 29-2-159 $50,000 per year of wrongful incarceration, to
be determined on a pro rata basis, plus any
discretionary amount that the committee
determines is appropriate, so long as the
legislature approves it.
California Cal. Penal Code § 4904 The California Victim Compensation and
Government Claims Board shall recommend
to the Legislature to indemnify the claimant in
the amount of "one hundred dollars ($100)
per day of incarceration . . . and that
appropriation shall not be treated as gross
income . . . ."
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. "In determining the amount of such
§ 54-102uu compensation, the Claims Commissioner
shall consider relevant factors including, but
not limited to" loss of earnings, loss of
earning capacity, loss of reputation, physical
pain and suffering, loss of familial
relationships, etc.
Florida Fla. Stat. § 961.06 "$50,000 for each year of wrongful
incarceration," to be determined on a pro rata
basis and adjusted for inflation; plus, some
education expenses, reasonable attorney's
fees, and reimbursement for fines and court
costs paid, etc. "The total compensation
awarded ... may not exceed $2 million."
Illinois 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/8 "[T]he amount of the award is at the
(2009) discretion of the court [but] the court shall
make no award in excess of the following
amounts: for imprisonment of 5 years or less,
not more than $85,350; for imprisonment of
14 years or less but over 5 years, not more
than $170,000; for imprisonment of over 14
years, not more than $199,150; and provided
further, the court shall fix attorney's fees not
to exceed 25% of the award granted." These
limits shall be adjusted for inflation by the
court as necessary.
Iowa Iowa Code § 663A.1 Damages are limited to $50 per day
incarcerated and lost wages up to $25,000
per year, plus fines and court costs paid,
reasonable attorney's fees and costs, etc.
Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 572.8 $25,000 per year incarcerated, not to exceed
a maximum total amount of $250,000, plus
up to $80,000 in tuition, job skills training,
counseling, etc.
Maine Me. Rev. Stat. 14 §§ 8241 & "[The claim for and award of damages,
8242 including costs, against the State may not
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exceed $300,000 for all claims arising as a
result of a single conviction."
Maryland Md. Code Ann., State Fin. & "[T]he Board of Public Works may grant to an
Proc. § 10-501 (2010) individual erroneously convicted, sentenced,
and confined under State law for a crime the
individual did not commit an amount
commensurate with the actual damages
sustained by the individual, and may grant a
reasonable amount for any financial or other
appropriate counseling for the individual, due
to the confinement."
Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D "[T]he court or the jury shall determine the
§ 5 (2010) damages that shall be payable to the
claimant. In making such determination, the
court or jury shall consider, but not be limited
to, the consideration of:" lost earnings, length
and conditions of confinement, etc. "A
judgment against the commonwealth may not
include punitive or exemplary damages. The
total liability of the commonwealth for any
judgment entered under this chapter shall not
exceed $500,000."
Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. § 11-44- $50,000 per year, but the total amount
7(2) (2010) awarded may not exceed $500,000. The
exoneree is also entitled to some reasonable
attorney's fees for brining this civil claim.
Missouri Mo. Rev. Stat. § 650.058(1) "The individual may receive an amount of fifty
(2010) dollars per day for each day of post-
conviction incarceration
Montana Mont. Code Ann. § 53-1-214 Educational aid.
(2010)
Nebraska Nb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4604 Exoneree is entitled to "damages found to
(2010) proximately result from the wrongful
conviction," but damages may not exceed
$500,000.
New N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541- "If a claim is filed against the state for time
Hampshire B:14(II) (2010) unjustly served in the state prison when a
person is found to be innocent of the crime
for which he was convicted, such a claim
shall be limited to an award not to exceed
$20,000."
New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:40-5 "Damages awarded under this act shall not
(2010) exceed twice the amount of the claimant's
income in the year prior to his incarceration
or $20,000.00 for each year of incarceration,
whichever is greater." The claimant is also
entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.
New York N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8-B(6) "If the court finds that the claimant is entitled
(2007) to a judgment, it shall award damages in
such sum of money as the court determines
will fairly and reasonably compensate him."
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North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-84(a), $50,000 per year incarcerated, to be
(c) determined on a pro rata basis, but total
amount awarded may not exceed $750,000.
Exoneree may also be eligible to receive job
skills training and expenses for tuition and
fees at any public North Carolina community
college.
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Exoneree may recover $40,330 per year
§ 2743.48(E)(2) (2010) incarcerated, to be determined on a pro rated
basis and to be adjusted for inflation; lost
wages; fines, court costs, etc., paid;
reasonable attorney's fees and costs. From
this amount, exoneree's recovery is debted
by the following costs incurred by the state:
payment for services at a detention facility,
such as for sick call visits; food and housing;
supervision; and ancillary services provided.
Oklahoma Okla. Stat. tit. 51, Any damages award "for wrongful criminal
§§ 154(B)(4) & (C) (2010). felony conviction resulting in imprisonment
shall not exceed ... $175,000." And no
award may include punitive or exemplary
damages.
Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8- "Compensation payable to such persons
108(7)(c) (2010) shall be determined by the board considering
all factors the board considers relevant
including, but not limited to, the person's
physical and mental suffering and loss of
earnings; provided, however, that the
maximum aggregate total of such
compensation shall not exceed one million
dollars ($1,000,000)." (limited survival, too)
Texas Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. $80,000 per year, to be determined on a pro
Code Ann. § 103.052 rata basis, plus child support payments owed
(2010), § 103.054 (2010) and educational tuition and fees.
Utah Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9- For every year wrongfully incarcerated, but
405(1) (2009) only up to a maximum of fifteen years,
petitioner is entitled to "the monetary
equivalent of the average annual
nonagricultural payroll wage in Utah," to be
determined on a pro rata basis.
Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 13, Exoneree is "entitled to damages in an
§ 5574(b) amount to be determined by the trier of fact
for each year the claimant was incarcerated,
provided that the amount of damages shall
not be less than $30,000.00 nor greater than
$60,000.00 for each year the claimant was
incarcerated, adjusted proportionally for
partial years served. Damages may also
include economic damages, including lost
wages and costs incurred for exoneree's
criminal defense, etc.; reasonable




Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 8.01- Exoneree wrongfully incarcerated for felony
195.11(A) & (C) (2010) "may be awarded compensation in an
amount equal to 90 percent of the Virginia
per capita personal income . . . for each year,
or portion thereof, of incarceration up to 20
years." Exoneree may also receive a
transition assistance grant of $15,000, which
is to be deducted from the prior amount, plus
up to $10,000 in tuition reimbursement after
successful completion of a program within
the Virginia community college system.
West Virginia W. Va. Code § 14-2-13 "If the court finds that the claimant is entitled
(2010) to a judgment, it shall award damages in
such sum of money as the court determines
will fairly and reasonably compensate him."
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4) "[T]he claims board shall find the amount
which will equitably compensate the
petitioner, not to exceed $25,000 and at a
rate of compensation not greater than $5,000
per year for the imprisonment." This amount
shall include any attorney fees, costs, etc. If
the claims board finds that this total amount
does not sufficiently compensate the
exoneree, it shall submit a report to the
legislature specifying the amount it considers
adequate.
District of D.C. Code Ann. § 2-423 "Upon a finding by the judge of unjust
Columbia (2001) imprisonment .. .the judge may award
damages. Punitive damages may not be
awarded."
Federal 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (2010) "The amount of damages awarded shall not
Government exceed $100,000 for each 12-month period
of incarceration for any plaintiff who was
unjustly sentenced to death and $50,000 for
each 12-month period of incarceration for
any other plaintiff."
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